Edited by Ksenya Kiebuzinski and Alexander Motyl

The Great West Ukrainian Prison Massacre of 1941

A Sourcebook

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Без напису

Одних із розпаленим зором,
Із високим, блідим чолом,
Під гуркіт автомотору
Розстріляли вночі гуртом.

А тих, кого у підвалах
Не поклав під стіну наган –
Сніговіями привітала
Сибірська біла тайга.

А й сестрам краще не дано,
– Однакова доля для всіх,
В солончаках Казахстану
По аулах гвалтують їх.

Висипається зерно. В житі
Непоховані трупи лежать,
В селі – нехрищені діти,
І нікому пожати збіжа.

Над краєм подих погуби
На волі, як і в тюрмі,
Бо й ті, що лишилися, зуби
На себе шкірять самі.

На обріях – димні хмари,
Всю землю порох повив,
Чи ж мало ярма і кари
За гріхи батьків і дідів?

Ворожою кровю замало
Напоїли вони поля,
І нашого нині, без жалю,
Напувається спрагла земля.

No Inscription

Some with eyes ablaze
With foreheads, high and pale,
To the thunder of motors
Were shot amassed at night.

While those who escaped
The guns in the cellars
Were greeted by the snowstorms
Of Siberia's white taiga.

Their sisters fared no better,
The same fate met them all.
In the salt marshes of Kazakhstan
They're being raped in the villages.

The seeds are strewn. In the rye
Unburied corpses lie.
The village children are unbaptized,
And there's no one to harvest the grain.

Above the land the breath of death
Is inside the prisons and outside,
For even those who survived
Bared teeth at themselves.

On the horizons are smoky clouds,
The land has been swept with dust.
Are there too few yokes and blows
For the sins of fathers and grandfathers?

They fed their fields
With too little enemy blood,
And it's ours that, mercilessly,
The thirsty earth now drinks.

Iur. Burevii [Sviatoslav Hordyns'kyi], *Iliustrovani visti* 10 (1941): 6. Translated by Alexander Motyl

Figure 1 Map



Map compiled and drawn by staff of the Map and Data Library, University of Toronto, using current external and internal political boundaries, based on a dataset by GFK Macon Global Maps (Germany, 2009). Numbers sourced primarily from Romaniv and Fedushchak, *Zakhidnoukraïns'ka trahediia 1941*, 63, and Mikoda, *Zbrodnicza ewakuacja więzień i aresztów NKWD*, 75-77. Additional figures derived from: (Bibrka) *Russian Oppression in Ukraine*, 188; (Boryslav) Wróbel, 'Polish-Ukrainian Relations during World War II', 224; (Pidbuzh) Hons'kyi, 'Shche odyn etap henotsydu. Iak ubyvaly v'iazniv u tiurmakh 1941 roku'; and (Turka) Zeifert, 'Stories of the Great Misfortune', 230.

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Introduction

Ksenya Kiebuzinski and Alexander Motyl

The Great West Ukrainian Prison Massacre of 1941: A Sourcebook is both a scholarly undertaking and a personal quest. While we hope to fill an important lacuna in the literature on Soviet mass killings in Ukraine, we have in part been motivated to do so by the fact that both of us had relatives who were murdered in what we call the Great West Ukrainian Prison Massacre of 1941. Although their tragic deaths may not endow us with perspicacity, they do endow an otherwise academic project with a clear moral dimension. The point of remembering Soviet atrocities, like the point of remembering all atrocities committed by criminal regimes, is not to dwell on the past, but to honor the dead and to hope that a better understanding of the mechanisms of mass murder will reduce the likelihood of its future occurrence. The horrible deaths experienced by our relatives, Father Ivan Kiebuz and Bohdan Hevko, are a reminder that all totalitarian regimes regard human life as expendable material in their fanatical pursuit of ideologically defined revolutionary goals.

The Soviet regime has been especially inhumane toward Ukraine and Ukrainians – a fact that concerns us as human beings, as scholars, and as persons of Ukrainian descent. According to a study published by the Moscow-based Institute of Demography,[1] Ukraine suffered close to 15 million 'excess deaths' between 1914 and 1948. Of that number, about 7.5 million were attributable to Soviet policies and 6.5 million to Nazi policies. According to Nicolas Werth, meanwhile, the Stalinist regime killed some 12 million of its people.[2] When we consider that over half of them were Ukrainian (far in excess of Ukrainians' share of the total Soviet population), it is hard not to register outrage at this monstrous system's hostility to its people in general and Ukrainians in particular.

The Great West Ukrainian Prison Massacre's victims were about 70 percent Ukrainian, 20 percent Polish, and 10 percent others (including

1 Nataliia Levchuk et al., 'Ukraina stradaet ot chrezmernoi smertnosti naseleniia v trudoaktivnom vozraste,' *Polit.ru* (15 April 2008), http://www.polit.ru/research/2008/04/15/demoscope327_print.html.

2 Nicolas Werth, 'State Violence in Stalin's Regime: Outline for an Inventory and Classification,' paper presented as a part of 'Terror and the Making of Modern Europe: Transatlantic Perspectives on the History of Violence,' April 2008, France-Stanford Center for Interdisciplinary Studies, http://francestanford.stanford.edu/sites/francestanford.stanford.edu/files/Werth.pdf.

Jews). It would be disingenuous, and dishonest, to claim that the Massacre was not a tragedy for Ukrainians above all or that it was a tragedy of equal importance for Ukrainians, Poles, and Jews. This would be the equivalent of claiming that, because over a hundred thousand Poles and several hundred Ukrainians died in the Auschwitz-Birkenau death camps, Auschwitz is therefore equally a tragedy for Jews, Poles, and Ukrainians. At the same time, it is important to recognize that two separate tragedies took place in Western Ukraine in the summer of 1941: the first was the Massacre, carried out by the NKVD against the mostly Ukrainian prison population. The second was the wave of anti-Jewish pogroms that swept much of the region (as well as many of the territories abandoned by the Soviets), which were committed by German units tasked with destroying Jews and elements of the local Ukrainian and Polish population who perceived Jews as complicit in or responsible for the prison killings.

We completed this book at a time of heightened aggression against Ukraine and Ukrainians by the Soviet Union's successor state – the Russian Federation – and its dictatorial leader, Vladimir Putin. Once again, an authoritarian regime that, like the Soviet one, had its home in Russia was killing Ukrainians and engaging in a blatant cover-up of its war crimes and crimes against humanity. Although the Soviet Union was a Russian empire and the Russian Federation is its successor, we refuse to blame the ongoing war in eastern Ukraine on 'the' Russians. Although many Russians are implicated in the crimes of the Putin regime, the regime and its leader are the criminals.[3] Even so, we were saddened by the widespread willingness of many Russians to look on the Putin regime's war crimes with the same passivity, indifference, or, even, approbation with which many Germans, who claimed not to know, viewed Hitler's crimes. We were equally saddened by Putin's Western apologists, who abetted his regime's criminal behavior by denying its criminality. For too many people, evidently, resistance is as little the first response to injustice as speaking truth to power is the natural inclination of intellectuals – points of some relevance to understanding the Massacre and its causes, consequences, interpretation, and instrumentalization.

3 The current Russian leadership even resorts to Soviet rhetoric and symbols, while the leaders of the separatist movement in eastern Ukraine employ World War II-era practices, such as Igor (Strelkov) Girkin's repromulgation of Stalin's 22 June 1941 order on the execution of criminals in territories they occupy. See Sergei I. Zhuk, 'Ukrainian Maidan as the Last Anti-Soviet Revolution, or the Methodological Dangers of Soviet Nostalgia (Notes of an American Ukrainian historian from inside the field of Russian studies in the USA),' *Ab Imperio* 3 (2014): 199-200.

As we compiled this material, we realized, yet again, just how important it is for scholarship to eschew crude, essentialist oversimplifications about entire peoples. Although it is valid to speak of 'strategic logics,' it is important to understand that 'the' Ukrainians, 'the' Poles, and 'the' Jews do not exist, as 'their' desires, hopes, and aspirations cannot be assumed to be uniform and stable. It is also important for scholars to analyze human behavior on the assumption that no peoples are intrinsically predisposed to violence, brutality, and cowardice. All people are alike: all are rational and/or irrational, all are human, all are imperfect, and all are capable of both good and evil. And all violent human deaths are equally tragic. Killing is a crime and mass killing is a crime against humanity, regardless of whether the victims or perpetrators were Poles, Jews, Ukrainians, or Russians.

An evenhanded, objective, and yet ethically rooted approach is especially important in discussions of relations between and among Ukrainians, Poles, and Jews. We have been struck by how much explicit and implicit stereotyping underlies both the memoirs of Ukrainian, Polish, and Jewish eyewitnesses and the scholarly narratives of some academics – a point we return to in greater detail below. But we must also recognize that the stereotypes found in eyewitness accounts and scholarship reflect the phenomenological realities of their authors. We cannot just dismiss them as instances of primordial, irrational animosities, as these perceptions were or are rooted in the everyday experiences of real people. To reduce their views to simple stereotyping is to deny them a voice – an 'othering' strategy that, after Edward Said's work on Orientalism,[4] should have little coin in serious scholarship.

Studying Polish-Ukrainian-Jewish relations in general or any of the dyads in particular is a difficult undertaking that requires sensitivity to nuance, complexity, and context and the avoidance of political agendas, instrumentalization, and scapegoating. A good way to avoid such assumptions and maintain maximal objectivity is to regard pogroms as instances of ethnic violence and to view ethnic violence in Western Ukraine comparatively and in terms of the extensive social science literature on its causes and consequences. Such a strategy also means viewing ethnic violence as a specific manifestation of the more general notion of ethnic conflict as well as viewing ethnic conflict as a specific manifestation of the still more general notion of ethnic relations. In effect, then, ethnic violence can be understood only if it is placed in the context of ethnic relations (especially at a time of war, which distorts and disrupts even the best of relations) and

4 Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage, 1979).

if unidimensional, monocausal, simplistic explanations are eschewed. The final step in attaining a more scholarly understanding of the anti-Jewish violence in Western Ukraine would be to examine it comparatively, with respect to the many instances of interethnic violence that have occurred, and continue to occur, throughout the world.[5] It is only in this manner that the violence that took place in Western Ukraine in the summer of 1941 can ultimately be understood on its own terms and not as a bit part of some grand teleological narrative relating to the travails of Polish statehood, the desirability of Ukrainian independence, or the inevitability of Jewish suffering.

Eschewing simplistic explanatory schemes also means avoiding simplistic binary oppositions, such as those between 'good Jews' and 'bad Poles' or 'bad Jews' and 'good Ukrainians.' Human behavior is always a complex agglomeration of shifting ethical stances and unpredictable moral choices. Klaus-Peter Friedrich puts it well: 'In the reality of the occupation [of Poland by the Nazis], the behavior of those willing to cooperate rarely fits today's black-and-white standards … [H]ardly anyone was purely a collaborator or a resistance fighter. Everyday life under the occupation frequently called for compromising.'[6] We would only add that 'everyday life' *always and everywhere* 'calls for compromising' – even in liberal democracies.

The Literature on the Massacre

After Nazi Germany launched Operation Barbarossa on 22 June 1941 against its collaborator, friend, and ally, the USSR, the Soviet secret police, the

5 An obvious point of comparison would be the anti-Chinese riots that took place in the Tibetan capital, Lhasa, in March 2008: 'Your correspondent, the only foreign journalist with official permission to be in Lhasa when the violence erupted, saw crowds hurling chunks of concrete at the numerous small shops run by ethnic Chinese lining the streets of the city's old Tibetan quarter. They threw them too at those Chinese caught on the streets – a boy on a bicycle, taxis (whose drivers are often Chinese) and even a bus. Most Chinese fled the area as quickly as they could, leaving their shops shuttered. The mobs, ranging from small groups of youths (some armed with traditional Tibetan swords) to crowds of many dozens, including women and children, rampaged through the narrow alleys of the Tibetan quarter. They battered the shutters of shops, broke in and seized whatever they could, from hunks of meat to gas canisters and clothing. Some goods they carried away – little children could be seen looting a toyshop – but most they heaped in the streets and set alight' ('Fire on the Roof of the World,' *The Economist*, 14 March 2008, http://www.economist.com/node/10870258).

6 Klaus-Peter Friedrich, 'Collaboration in a "Land without a Quisling": Patterns of Cooperation with the Nazi German Occupation Regime in Poland during World War II,' *Slavic Review* 64, no. 4 (Winter 2005): 743.

NKVD, slaughtered somewhere between 10,000 and 40,000 political prisoners in Western Ukraine in only eight days. Although the proportions varied slightly from prison to prison, reliable estimates suggest that, as noted above, no less than 70 percent of these prisoners were Ukrainians, about 20 percent were Poles, and the rest were Jews and other nationalities. The Massacre was not a spontaneous action by the retreating Red Army and NKVD, but, as numerous official documents attest, had been coordinated and planned by Soviet authorities.[7] Especially striking is the fact that many prisoners were, as their obviously mutilated bodies suggested, viciously tortured before they were killed.

Although 10,000-40,000 deaths may seem a relatively small number when compared to the millions exterminated by Stalin and Hitler, they are an important part of the story of World War II that has received insufficient attention in the scholarly literature on Stalin's policies in general and toward Ukraine in particular. Western histories of World War II tend to focus on the Holocaust, the Katyń massacres, Hitler's starvation of Soviet prisoners of war, and the loss of millions of civilian and soldiers' lives. Many experts ignore the Massacre in their writings about the war; many fail to appreciate just how deeply such an atrocity affected popular attitudes; some misunderstand what actually happened or reduce the Massacre to a minor footnote in the study of the Holocaust. We suspect that a large part of the reason that scholars have difficulty incorporating the Massacre into their narratives is that doing so seems to detract attention from, or call for equivalence with, the Holocaust.[8] Nothing could be further from the truth. The Holocaust stands as the greatest genocide of the twentieth century, regardless of whether or not one acknowledges the horror of the Massacre. At the same time, moral consistency demands of us that we condemn all mass violations of human rights, including the Massacre. One can certainly study an anti-Ukrainian and anti-Polish massacre without thereby diminishing Jewish victimhood just as one can study an anti-Jewish atrocity without thereby diminishing non-Jewish victimhood. To suggest otherwise is to instrumentalize human tragedies for political ends.

This brings us to the second reason for the Massacre's importance. The Massacre is critical to a full understanding of Soviet mass killings and,

7 See V.N. Merkulov, 'Predlozhenie NKGB No. 2445/M,' 23 June 1941, *Z arkhiviv VUChK, HPU, NKVD, KHB* 1 (1994): 192.

8 On the discursive power of the Holocaust, see Alexander Motyl, 'Why Is the "KGB Bar" Possible?: Binary Morality and Its Consequences,' *Nationalities Papers* 38, no. 5 (September 2010): 671-87, and Timothy Snyder, 'Holocaust: The Ignored Reality,' *New York Review of Books* 56, no. 12 (16 July 2009): 14-16.

thus, of Soviet totalitarianism. The Soviet authorities murdered some 12 million people in the 30-plus years between the Bolshevik seizure of power and Joseph Stalin's death. As Werth argues, more than half died of forced starvation; the rest perished in the Gulag or were shot, usually with a bullet to the back of the head.[9] Soviet killing under Stalin was methodical, even if it was not, as in the Nazi case, mechanical. 'Enemies of the people' were identified – be they clergy, peasants labeled as kulaks, Polish officers, Party members accused of espionage, engineers accused of being 'wreckers,' or dissident writers – and then systematically destroyed. The Massacre typifies Soviet atrocities in every respect but one. A large number of the prisoners were brutally tortured before being shot, suggesting that the Soviet secret police acted with a special animus engendered by the fact that most of the prisoners were Ukrainian nationalists, whom Soviet (and current Russian) propaganda branded as the worst kind of 'enemies of the people.' Unsurprisingly, the Soviet regime denied all involvement in the Massacre and tried to place the blame, as with the Katyń massacres, on the Nazis.[10]

Although the Massacre was one of the greatest single atrocities committed by the Soviet state, Werth's comprehensive 'Chronological Index: Mass Crimes under Stalin (1930-1953)' fails to mention it.[11] Among books on the history of Ukraine, most offer only a few sentences on the prison murders. John Paul Himka's detailed study of the 1941 L'viv pogrom devotes only several lines to the Massacre.[12] Karel Berkhoff (*Harvest of Despair*), Jan T. Gross (*Revolution from Abroad*), Timothy Snyder (*Bloodlands*), and Orest Subtelny ('The Soviet Occupation of Western Ukraine, 1939-41: An Overview') include several pages on the atrocities, but none of them does full justice to the Massacre.[13] The only author to have devoted extensive attention

9 Werth, 'State Violence in Stalin's Regime.'

10 For example, see V.M. Molotov's letter of 12 July 1941 to British Ambassador R.S. Cripps refuting claims that prisoners had been killed by the Soviet military in L'viv or suffered any reprisals, and that the rumor was a Nazi provocation. Document held in the Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation (AVP RF), fond 6 (The Molotov fond), opis 3, papka 1, delo 8, ll. 32-33. Further denials appeared in *Pravda* (Moscow) on 14 July and 9 August 1941.

11 Nicolas Werth, 'Mass Crimes under Stalin (1930-1953),' in *Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence* (March 2008), http://www.massviolence.org/Mass-crimes-under-Stalin-1930-1953.

12 John-Paul Himka, 'The Lviv Pogrom of 1941: The Germans, Ukrainian Nationalists, and the Carnival Crowd,' *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 53, nos. 2-4 (June-December 2011): 209-43.

13 Karel C. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004); Jan T. Gross, *Revolution from Abroad: The Soviet Conquest of Poland's Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia*, expanded ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002); Timothy Snyder, *Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin* (New York: Basic Books, 2010); and Orest Subtelny, 'The Soviet Occupation of Western Ukraine,

to this Soviet atrocity is Bogdan Musial, but his book, *'Konterrevolutionäre Elemente sind zu erschießen': Die Brutalisierung des deutsch-sowjetischen Krieges im Sommer 1941,* is deeply flawed by its bizarre claim that the extensive bodily mutilations were the post-Massacre handiwork of Ukrainian nationalists – an issue we discuss in greater detail below.[14]

The Massacre received attention from international bodies after the war. In 1954, the U.S. House of Representatives formed a Select Committee on Communist Aggression under the chairmanship of Congressman Charles J. Kersten of Wisconsin. The Select Committee's charge was to investigate matters concerning 'the subversion and destruction of free institutions and human liberties in all other areas controlled, directly or indirectly, by world communism.' Public hearings took place in the United States, Great Britain, and Germany, and several hundred witnesses testified on a variety of topics, including the systematic killing of political prisoners by the NKVD. The Committee presented its findings in a series of reports, including one on the *Communist Takeover and Occupation of Ukraine: Special Report No. 4* (1955).[15] Five years later, an international investigatory commission, 'Lemberg 1941,' was struck up in The Hague to look into the alleged participation of the Nachtigall Battalion (a German-sponsored military unit consisting of a few hundred Ukrainian nationalists) and its German officer attaché, Theodor Oberländer, in the pogroms in L'viv.[16] It concluded that neither Nachtigall nor Oberländer was complicit; however, controversy still surrounds the activities of the battalion.[17] In 1962, a collection of documents appeared in English on Russian colonialism and Soviet oppression in Ukraine, with one chapter devoted to the liquidation of Ukrainian prisoners by the NKVD, and including eyewitness reports gathered from the two above-mentioned

1939-41,' in *Ukraine during World War II: History and Its Aftermath*, ed. Yury Boshyk (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1986), 5-14.

14 Bogdan Musial, *'Konterrevolutionäre Elemente sind zu erschießen': Die Brutalisierung des deutsch-sowjetischen Krieges im Sommer 1941* (Berlin: Propyläen, 2000).

15 *Communist Takeover and Occupation of Ukraine: Special Report No. 4 of the Select Committee on Communist Aggression, House of Representatives, Eighty-third Congress, Second Session, under Authority of H. Res. 346 and H. Res. 438* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954).

16 Joop Zwart, *Lemberg 1941 und Oberländer: das Ergebnis einer Untersuchung* (Amstelveen: [Selbstverlag d. Verf.], 1960).

17 The investigation was reviewed and analyzed by legal historian Alfred-Maurice de Zayas in his chapter on L'viv in *Die Wehrmacht-Untersuchungsstelle: Deutsche Ermittlungen über alliierte Völkerrechtsverletzungen im Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Munich: Universitas-Verlag, Langen Müller, 1980).

commissions.[18] More recently, Poland, starting in 1989, began to investigate Stalinist crimes committed in its former eastern territories under the purview of the Institute of National Memory's Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish People. District commissions were created to look into crimes committed by NKVD officers in the eastern provinces' prisons from 1939 to 1941, and some of the results of their research were published in Polish in 1996 to mark the 55th anniversary of the Prison Massacre.[19]

While much has been published since the mid-1990s in Ukraine and Poland, the historical record is far from complete.[20] Access to the arrest records, interrogation protocols, trial proceedings, and convictions or execution orders was denied for many years, while letters by families of the victims to the archives of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) went unanswered. The voices of the relatives of victims are few, as most are no longer alive. Moreover, the trauma of the post-1945 Soviet period prevented many of the stories from being transmitted to a younger generation; when they were transmitted, the younger generations growing up under

18 *Russian Oppression in Ukraine: Reports and Documents* (London: Ukrainian Publishers, 1962).

19 Janina Mikoda, ed., *Zbrodnicza ewakuacja więzień i aresztów NKWD na Kresach Wschodnich II Rzeczypospolitej w czerwcu-lipcu 1941 roku: materiały z sesji naukowej w 55. rocznicę ewakuacji więźniów NKWD w głąb ZSRR, Łódź, 10 czerwca 1996 r.* (Warsaw: Główna Komisja Badania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 1997).

20 Here is one especially glaring example of the incompleteness of the historical record. The title of Musial's book, *Konterrevolutionäre Elemente sind zu erschiessen*, is taken from a telegram supposedly issued on 24 June by Lavrentii Beria, People's Commissar of Internal Affairs NKVD, and sent via his deputy, Vasilii Vasil'evich Chernyshev, to the NKVD Directorate in Ukraine, which stated that all prisoners who were under investigation for or convicted of counterrevolutionary acts, or those who were guilty of economic sabotage or other crimes against the Soviet Union, were to be shot. The footnote (fn 12) to the statement 'counterrevolutionary elements are to be shot' found on p. 105 in Musial, cites Albin Głowacki's *Sowieci wobec Polaków na ziemiach wschodnich II Rzeczypospolitej, 1939-1941* (Łodz: Wyd-wo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, 1997), 299. Głowacki (fn 102) refers to an article by Iosyp Patsiula, 'Pro zlochynnu diial'nist' KPSS-KPU proty naselennia Rivenshchyny v 1939-1941 rr.,' *Chas* [Kyïv] (21 June 1996): 4. Protsiura indicates that the telegram is held by the Archive of the Information Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs, L'viv. The same information about the document's location is provided in Ivan Bilas's collection *Represyvno-karal'na systema v Ukraïni 1917-1953*, vol. 1 (Kyïv, 1994), 128-29. However, Bilas does not include the text of the telegram in his book. Despite our best efforts, no published version of Beria's telegram has been found in print or online, nor was the director of the Department of Classified Information and Documents at the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVS), Iu.V. Tereshchenko, able to locate it within the State Archives of the MVS or in the Archives of the Main Department of Internal Affairs of the city of L'viv.

Communist rule often feared reprisals.[21] There is a dearth of documentation on the perpetrators of the atrocities. There is no comprehensive list of all the victims for each of the killing sites, although work on such a compilation is advancing.[22] With the appointment of new directors of archives following Viktor Yanukovych's abandonment of presidential office in 2014, efforts to declassify KGB archives and make them publicly accessible culminated in the Ukrainian parliament's adoption on 9 April 2015 of the law, 'On access to archives of repressive organs of the communist totalitarian regime of 1917-1991.'[23]

In sum, there is still far too little easily available material on the tragic events of June 1941. In particular, no one collection of materials sheds light on the Ukrainian, Polish, and Jewish dimensions of the Massacre, as this book does. Our sourcebook does not attempt to provide a thorough analysis of the mass killings. Nor is it a history. Our hope is that the publication of historical documents and previous scholarship on this tragic event will foster research into its causes and consequences and dissuade scholars from ignoring, minimizing, or instrumentalizing it. In particular, we hope that further research will focus on the perpetrators, generally identified as 'the NKVD.'[24] A thorough investigation of the eyewitness literature, Soviet, German, and Polish archives, and local Soviet Ukrainian newspapers might enable scholars to learn just who some of these people were and what they subsequently went on to do.[25] How many actually pulled triggers or engaged

21 As M. Rozhenko and I. Fedushchak point out, without knowledge of dates of death and places of burial, families cannot perform age-old rituals and established religious practices to honor their dead relatives (Mykola Rozhenko and Inna Fedushchak, *Cherven'-lypen' 1941 roku* (Kyïv: Ukraïns'kyi tsentr dukhovnoï kul'tury, 2001), 58-63).

22 Efforts were begun by Ukrainian branches of the Memorial Society in the late 1980s, and increased in 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when state oblast archives received existing copies of lists from the Security Service of Ukraine. Registers of victims' names began to be published in the journal *Z arkhiv VUChK, HPU, NKVD, KHB* beginning in 1994, as well as in several book volumes, regional publications, and local newspapers.

23 See 'Zakon pro dostup do arkhiviv represyvnykh orhaniv komunistychnoho totalitarnoho rezhymu 1917-1991 rokiv,' *Vidomosti Verkhovnoï rady Ukraïny* 26 (26 June 2015), 218.

24 See Lynne Viola, 'The Question of the Perpetrator in Soviet History,' *Slavic Review* 72, no. 1 (Spring 2013): 1-23; Aleksandr Gur'ianov and Aleksandr Kokurin, 'Ėvakuatsiia tiurem,'. *Karta: Rossiiskii nezavisimyi istoricheskii i pravozashchitnyi zhurnal* (Riazan') 6 (1994): 16-27.

25 Eyewitnesses mention the names of some local Soviet officials implicated in the Massacre. More detailed biographical information about some of the NKVD officials (I.M. Belotserkovskii, L.P. Beriia, V.M. Bochkov, V.V. Chernyshev, I.R. Lerman, V.N. Merkulov, P.Ia. Meshik, V.T. Sergienko) who signed or received documents is available in N.V. Petrov and K.V. Skorkin, eds., *Kto rukovodil NKVD, 1934-1941* (Moscow: 'Zven'ia,' 1999): 103-4, 106-7, 116, 271, 296-97, 378-80, 433-34; and (A.A. Chobotov, N.A. Diatlov, I.F. Kovalev, M.I. Nikol'skii) in N.V. Petrov, ed., *Kto rukovodil*

in torture? Are any of these criminals still alive – in North or South America, Western or Eastern Europe, Israel, or the countries of the post-Soviet space? Were there civilian collaborators or onlookers who failed to resist or protest or who did in fact resist or protest? The kinds of detailed research techniques developed by Holocaust scholars and self-styled Nazi hunters would be of great use in such an endeavor. And the impulse to discover who these individuals were would be identical to that behind Holocaust studies: historical curiosity and the imperative of justice.

Besides filling a lacuna in our knowledge of the Massacre, the sourcebook contributes contextual material for scholars working in the growing historical subdiscipline of Eastern European memory studies. The post-traumatic memory of the Massacre is a rich source for examining the social devastation of Western Ukraine, the psychological consequences for witnesses and survivors, and the impact on future generations living under Soviet and post-Soviet rule. Memories of what happened in June 1941 have resulted in divided memories of victimhood. This book hopes to bring traces of the past to the present through primary documents as well as incorporate stories about that past through Ukrainian, Polish, and Jewish recollections, so that readers can reflect and analyze history, as it is remembered in the original languages, from a variety of perspectives: private versus public history, national versus transnational history.

The Death Toll

In Soviet historiography, the 'Great Patriotic War' captures the period from 22 June 1941 to 9 May 1945 and conveniently ignores the first 21 months of World War II. Yet it was the 23 August 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany that actually led to war in Europe. The treaty divided Romania, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia,

organami gosbezopasnosti, 1941-1954 (Moscow: Obshchestvo 'Memorial'; Izd-vo 'Zven'ia', 2010): 351, 465-66, 643, 912-13. Lists of Soviet officials implicated in the Massacre are available in Ol'ha Ern, 'I zdryhnulas' zemlia,' *Svoboda narodiv* 2 (Spring 1995): 103-5, and in Antoni Galiński, 'Więzienia NKWD na Kresach Wschodnich II Rzeczypospolitej w latach 1939-1941 na podstawie dokumentacji Okręgowej Komisji Badania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu w Łodzi – Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej,' in *Zbrodnicza ewakuacja więzień i aresztów NKWD na Kresach wschodnich II Rzeczypospolitej w czerwcu-lipcu 1941 roku: materiały z sesji naukowej w 55. rocznicę ewakuacji więźniów NKWD w głąb ZSRR, Łódź, 10 czerwca 1996 r.*, ed. Janina Mikoda (Warsaw: Główna Komisja Badania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 1997), 55 (Annex 3).

and Finland into German and Soviet spheres of influence, anticipating potential 'territorial and political rearrangements' of these countries. Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union invaded, on 1 and 17 September respectively, their parts of Poland, dividing the country between them and marking the commencement of World War II. The predominately Ukrainian-inhabited lands east of the San and Buh (Bug in Polish) Rivers (i.e., eastern Galicia, western Polissia, and western Volhynia) – or Western Ukraine – became part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

The Soviets extolled to the local non-Polish populations (the two largest non-Polish groups were Ukrainians, about 5 million, and Jews, about 1 million[26]) their 'liberation' from Polish 'landlord' rule, while collectivizing and nationalizing land and abolishing Polish and non-Polish cultural organizations and political parties. Fearful of national, anti-Soviet elements and an educated class in the new lands, and of their potential influence on Ukrainians to the east, the NKVD entered the territory in force. Mass arrests and deportations of formerly Polish citizens ensued, targeting first Poles and Jews, and then Ukrainians. There is significant disagreement about the total number of deportees. According to Polish sources, in 1940-1941,

26 There are only approximate estimates of the number of Poles, Ukrainians, and Jews in Western Ukraine in 1939-1941. Volodymyr Kubijovyč concludes in his statistical analysis that the total population of Eastern Galicia, as of 1 January 1939, was 5,824,100, of which 3,727,000 (64.1%) were Ukrainians; 16,300 (0.3%) were Polish-speaking Ukrainians; 874,700 (15%) were Poles; 73,200 (1.2%) were Polish colonists; 514,300 (8.8%) were *Latynnyky* (Roman Catholics who spoke Ukrainian); 569,400 (9.8%) were Jews; and 49,200 (0.8%) belonged to other ethnic groups, mainly German (Volodymyr Kubijovyč, *Ethnic Groups of the South-Western Ukraine* (*Halyčyna – Galicia*) *1.1.1939* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1983), xxii-xxiii). According to Grzegorz Hryciuk, the population of Distrikt Galizien as of 31 December 1941 was: Germans 7686; Ukrainians 3,369,370; Poles 962,939; for a total of 4,339,995 (Grzegorz Hryciuk, *Przemiany narodowościowe i ludnościowe w Galicji Wschodniej i na Wołyniu w latach 1931-1948* (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2005), 205). For Volhynia, one needs to go back to the 1931 Polish census, according to which there were: Roman Catholics 327,900; Orthodox 1,455,900; Greek Catholics 11,100; Protestants 53,400; other Christians 27,900; Jews 207,800; nondenominational 1500; for a total of 2,085,600 (see *Drugi Powszechny Spis Ludności z dn. 9 XII 1931 r. Mieszkania i gospodarstwa domowe. Ludność. Stosunki zawodowe*, Statystyka Polski, Seria C, z. 70, *Województwo wołynskie* (Warsaw, 1938), 26-27). If we take the 3,727,000 Galician Ukrainians and add to to them the 1,455,900 Volhynian Orthodox, we get about 5 million Ukrainians (5,182,900 to be exact). The corresponding figures for Poles would be 874,700 plus 514,300 in Galicia and 327,900 for Volhynia, or about 1.5 million (1,716,900 to be exact). Jews amount to 569,400 for Galicia, 207,800 for Volhynia, and up to 200,000-300,000 refugees from Nazi-occupied Poland, for about 1 million. The figure for Jewish refugees from Poland comes from Wendy Lower, *The Diary of Samuel Golfard and the Holocaust in Galicia* (Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press, 2011), 28. In all three cases, we are using simple approximations of the numbers since the data are approximate and not quite comparable.

at least 1 million people were deported,[27] of whom 150,000-400,000 were Ukrainians.[28] The Ukrainian historian Iu.A. Kyrychuk places the number of deportees at 550,000.[29] According to Soviet secret police sources, the total number of deportees from Western Ukraine was 190,100, of whom 52 percent (100,000) were Poles, 32 percent (60,000) were Jews, and 13 percent (25,500) were Ukrainians.[30] The Soviets appear to have evacuated some 140,000 prisoners in late June 1941 for transfer to other prisons and camps – only to kill many of them en route or in killing fields further east.[31]

There is also disagreement about the total number of killed prisoners. NKVD sources place the number at 9,817.[32] Orest Subtelny, a Canadian historian, says it was 15,000[33]; two Ukrainian historians suggest the number was 22,000.[34] One Polish historian, Krzysztof Popiński, places it between

27 The 1 million figure is found in Wojciech Materski and Tomasz Szarota, *Polska 1939-1945: straty osobowe i ofiary represji pod dwiema okupacjami* (Warsaw: Institute of National Remembrance, 2009), 30. The Cartographic Service of the Polish Army in the East placed the number at 1.5 million, while a 1944 Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs memorandum put the number at 1.25 million (see Gross, *Revolution from Abroad*, 193-94). Gross suggests 'the grand total may have been in truth closer to 1.5 million' (ibid., 194).

28 The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs estimated that 52 percent of deportees were Poles, 30 percent were Jews, and 18 percent were Ukrainians and Belarusians (see Gross, *Revolution from Abroad*, xxi; and Janusz Zajączkowski, *Trudne sąsiedztwa: Polska i Ukraina a Rosja i Niemcy. 3, Druga wojna* (Lublin: Werset, 2013), 77). According to this estimate, if, say, 15 percent were Ukrainian (on the rationale that the Ukrainians were much more nationalist than the Belarusians), they would account for 150,000 of 1 million deportees, 187,500 of 1.25 million, and 225,000 of 1.5 million. If one considers that at least 550,000 deportees came from Western Ukraine, where Ukrainians comprised about two-thirds of the total population (5 million of 7.5 million), and if one believes that Soviet attitudes toward Western Ukraine's nationally conscious Ukrainian population could not have been more lenient than those toward Poles and Jews, then it seems reasonable to suggest that the Ukrainian share of 550,000 probably reflected the Ukrainian share of the total population, two-thirds, and therefore amounted to about 370,000. The 400,000 figure is Metropolitan Andrei Sheptyts'kyi's (see Subtelny, 'The Soviet Occupation,' 5-14).

29 Iu.A. Kyrychuk, 'Radians'kyi teror 1939-1941 rr.,' in *Politychnyi teror i teroryzm v Ukraïni, XIX-XX st.: istorychni narysy*, ed. Volodymyr Lytvyn et al. (Kyïv: Naukova dumka, 2002), 585.

30 Volodymyr Baran and Vasyl' Tokars'kyi, *'Zachystka': Politychni represiï v zakhidnykh oblastiakh Ukraïny, 1939-1941* (L'viv: Natsional'na akademiia nauk Ukraïny, Instytut ukraïnoznavstva im. I. Kryp'iakevycha, 2014), 337.

31 V.A. Volkhonskii, 'Spravka Tiuremnogo upravleniia NKVD SSSR ob itogakh evakuatsii zakliuchennykh iz tiurem NKVD-UNKVD' (22 January 1942), in N.I. Vladimirtsev and A.I. Kokurin, eds., *NKVD-MVD SSSR v bor'be s banditizmom i vooruzhennym natsionalisticheskim podpol'em na zapadnoi Ukraine, v zapadnoi Belorussii i Pribaltike, 1939-1956* (Moscow: MVD Rossii, 2008), 67-68.

32 Ibid.

33 Subtelny, 'The Soviet Occupation,' 12.

34 Oleh Romaniv and Inna Fedushchak, 'Tiuremna vakkhanaliia agonizuiuchoho rezhymu,' in *Zakhidnoukraïns'ka trahediia 1941* (L'viv: Naukove t-vo im. Shevchenka, 2002), 51-63.

20,000 and 24,000[35]; two others, Witold Mędykowski and Bogdan Musial, put it between 20,000 and 30,000.[36] Least plausibly, Gross notes that 'the NKVD may have killed as many as 100,000 people during the evacuation of prisons in the Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia during June and July 1941.'[37] The NKVD number has the advantage of being derived from secret police documents, but its extreme precision at a time of chaos and mass flight before the advancing Wehrmacht warrants suspicion. Could the NKVD really have noted every single prisoner it executed, especially if it did so under the pressure of the advancing German army or while torturing prisoners?[38] We know, for example, that the NKVD number excludes the prisoners killed in Dobromyl′ and the slaughter in the neighboring Salina salt mine, as well as the scores of sporadic killings in smaller towns and villages, such as Bibrka and Zhovkva. Could the NKVD really keep track of all the people who were killed while trying to flee? Is it plausible to think it kept tabs on all those who died while being transported or during forced marches?[39] As one NKVD official in L′viv noted on 24 June 1941: 'Since the start of the war many arrestees have been entering Prison No. 1 without the suitable paperwork.'[40] Another official described the extreme confusion that characterized the killings in Berezhany.[41] Musial points out that Soviet data exist for only twenty-eight of fifty-eight prisons and that there are

35 Krzysztof Popiński, 'Ewakuacja więzień kresowych w czerwcu 1941 r. na podstawie dokumentacji 'Memoriału' i Archiwum Wschodniego,' in *Zbrodnicza ewakuacja więzień i aresztów NKWD na Kresach Wschodnich II Rzeczypospolitej w czerwcu-lipcu 1941 roku: materiały z sesji naukowej w 55. rocznicę ewakuacji więźniów NKWD w głąb ZSRR, Łódź, 10 czerwca 1996 r.*, ed. Janina Mikoda (Warsaw: Główna Komisja Badania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 1997), 73-77.

36 Witold Mędykowski, *W cieniu gigantów: pogromy 1941 r. w byłej sowieckiej strefie okupacyjnej: kontekst historyczny, społeczny i kulturowy* (Warsaw: Instytut Studiów Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 2012), 159; Musial, *'Konterrevolutionäre Elemente sind zu erschießen,'* 135-38.

37 Gross, *Revolution from Abroad*, 228.

38 Andrii Zhyv'iuk makes this point with respect to the prison in Dubno. See *Za Moskovs'kym chasom: kontroversiï radianizatsiï Rivnenshchyny* (*kinets' 1930-kh-kinets' 1950-kh rokiv*) (Rivne: Papirus-Druk, 2011), 41.

39 Volkhonskii, 'Spravka Tiuremnogo,' 67-68.

40 Report by Chief of the L′viv oblast′ NKVD Prison Department, Lieutenant Iosif Rafailovich Lerman, to Chief of L′viv oblast′ NKVD, Captain Nikolai Alekseevich Diatlov, on the status of prisoners in L′viv (24 June 1941), in *Zolochivshchyna: mynule i suchasne*, ed. Mykola Dubas, 2nd ed. (L′viv: Ms, 2006), 292.

41 Memorandum on the execution of prisoners in Berezhany, Ternopil′ oblast′ to Chief of NKVD Prison Department, Ukrainian SSR, Andrei Filippovich Filippov (8 July 1941), in *Represyvno-karal'na systema v Ukraïni 1917-1953: suspil'no-politychnyi ta istoryko-pravovyi analiz: u dvokh knyhakh*, ed. Ivan Bilas, vol. 2 (Kyïv: Lybid′, 1994), 248-49.

no statistics at all for local holding pens (‘*Arrestlokale*’).[42] The historians’ estimates are not as exact as the NKVD’s number, but they more accurately capture the full magnitude of the killings.

Whatever the exact number – 10,000, 20,000, 30,000, or what is likely, despite Gross’s estimate, the highest possible number, 40,000 – there is general agreement that over two-thirds of the victims were Ukrainians and one-fifth (or slightly more) were Poles. Jews were also arrested in significant numbers, and accounted for 28 percent of prisoners during the twenty-one months of the Soviet occupation of Western Ukraine and 11 percent at the time of the Massacre.[43] Among the dead were also Czechs, Germans, Belarusians, and Russians.[44]

A closer look at the statistical data suggests that these percentages may be in need of revision. Although Poles were overrepresented among the prisoners in 1939-1940 (41 percent of the prison population), most of them had been forcibly resettled to Siberia and Central Asia during the four mass deportation operations of February, April, and June 1940, and from mid-May to mid-June 1941 (or had died or been killed during the process). All of this transpired *before* the June 1941 Massacre. In February 1940 alone, 88,000-89,000 people were deported from Western Ukraine: Poles comprised over 80 percent of that number.[45] According to NKVD statistics, the monthly tally of arrests of Poles peaked at 2759 in April 1940 and then slowly declined. Monthly arrests of Ukrainians rose and reached their highest point, 2094, in September 1940, and then fell off, while remaining four times higher

42 Musial, *‘Konterrevolutionäre Elemente sind zu erschießen,’* 138.

43 Grzegorz Hryciuk observes that the high percentage of Jews among the prison population resulted from the arrests of single male Jewish refugees (i.e., *odinochki*) during the deportation operation of June 1940. See Hryciuk, ‘Victims 1939-1941: The Soviet Repressions in Eastern Poland,’ in *Shared History – Divided Memory: Jews and Others in Soviet-occupied Poland*, ed. Elazar Barkan, Elizabeth A. Cole, and Kai Struve (Leipzig: Simon-Dubnow-Institut für Jüdische Geschichte und Kultur e.V.: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2007), 184. Rafał Wnuk notes that Jews accounted for nearly 85 percent of the 51,000-58,000 people deported from Western Ukraine during the third operation, which occurred 28-29 June 1940 (Rafał Wnuk, ‘Resistance 1939-1941: The Polish Underground under Soviet Occupation and the Jews,’ in *Shared History – Divided Memory*, 170n59).

44 O.A. Gorlanov and A.B. Roginskii, ‘Ob arestakh v zapadnykh oblastiakh Belorussii i Ukrainy v 1939-1941 gg.,’ in *Repressii protiv poliakov i pol’skikh grazhdan*, ed. A.Ė. Gur’ianov (Moskva: Zven’ia, 1997), 104.

45 ‘Represje 1939-41,’ in Stanisław Ciesielski, Wojciech Materski, and Andrzej Paczkowski, *Represje sowieckie wobec Polaków i obywateli polskich*, 2nd ed. (Warsaw: Karta, 2002), 15-16. The number of deportees from Western Ukraine during the final operation was about 11,000. The operation began on 22 May 1941 and was suspended when the Germans invaded and began their heavy bombardment campaign beginning 22 June (ibid., 17).

than the total number of arrests of Poles from October 1940 to May 1941 (9613 Ukrainians, 2293 Poles).[46] Ukrainians comprised 75 percent of the total number of inmates from January to May 1941.[47]

The shift in emphasis from arresting Poles in 1939-1940 to arresting Ukrainians in 1940-1941 was not accidental, reflecting a growing realization by the Soviet authorities that Germany posed a serious threat. That realization implied both a relaxation of Soviet policy toward Poles[48] (and perhaps Jews) and an intensified crackdown on Ukrainian nationalists, viewed by Soviet authorities as being pro-German.[49] (As the large number of non-members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists [OUN] among the massacred dead attests, the Soviets had a broad definition of Ukrainian nationalists.) Reinforcing this point statistically, O.A. Gorlanov and A.B. Roginskii note that, in January-June 1941, 90 percent of all arrests in the Soviet Union for 'anti-Soviet conspiracy' were made in Western Ukraine and 68.3 percent for 'insurgency and political banditism' were made in Western Ukraine and Western Belarus.[50] Less is known about the nationality of the persons arrested in the last week of June 1941, although it is very likely that most would have been Ukrainian nationalists perceived by the NKVD as allies of the approaching German forces. It is, thus, quite possible that Ukrainians comprised 75 percent or more of the victims of the Massacre. Until more reliable estimates are made, however, we think it wise to adopt the more conservative figure of 70 percent.

The percentages – when rounded to 70 percent for Ukrainians and 20 percent for Poles – translate into at least 7000, 14,000, 21,000, or 28,000 dead Ukrainians in eight days or, respectively, 875, 1750, 2625, or 3500 victims per day. Similarly, for Poles, these figures translate into 2000, 4000, 6000, or 8000 dead in eight days or, respectively, 250, 500, 750, or 1000 per day. If we consider that the total number of Ukrainians in Western Ukraine (about 5 million) was about three times that of Poles (about 1.5 million), then the

46 Derived from a table in Gorlanov and Roginskii, 'Ob arestakh v zapadnykh oblastiakh Belorussii,' 88. See also Ihor Derev'ianyi, 'Masovi rozstrily u v'iaznytsi No. 1 m. L'vova v kintsi chervnia 1941 roku,' *Ukraïns'kyi vyzvol'nyi rukh* 13 (2009): 98.

47 Calculated from Gorlanov and Roginskii, 'Ob arestakh v zapadnykh oblastiakh Belorussii,' 88.

48 Christoph Mick, 'Lviv under Soviet Rule, 1939-1941,' in *Stalin and Europe: Imitation and Domination, 1928-1953*, ed. Timothy Snyder and Ray Brandon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 152-54.

49 Artur Wysocki, *Zderzenie kultur: polskość i sowieckość na ziemiach wschodnich Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w latach 1939-1941 we wspomnieniach Polaków* (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 2014), 280.

50 Gorlanov and Roginskii, 'Ob arestakh v zapadnykh oblastiakh Belorussii,' 91.

relative size of the population loss was as great for Poles as for Ukrainians. At the same time, the fact that the Massacre was an overwhelmingly Ukrainian tragedy, and thus an overwhelmingly Ukrainian shock and trauma, may go some way toward explaining why most observers appear to agree that Ukrainians, who were a minority in most Galician cities and towns, figured more prominently than Poles in subsequent anti-Jewish violence.

No less important than the number of dead is that they were discovered within the space of little more than one week, in a single sustained, relentless wave. Every time the Soviets evacuated and/or the Germans entered a city or town, heaps of rotting corpses were found in prisons, ditches, or rivers. And since this was the height of summer, memoirists and eyewitnesses invariably mention the unbearable stench. The fact that the NKVD spent scarce time and resources massacring and gratuitously torturing prisoners[51] struck many Ukrainians and Poles as proof of their victimization at the hands of communists in general and Jewish communists in particular. And if, as we suggest, both Poles and Ukrainians were prone to victimization narratives, then it is highly likely that they viewed the Massacre in its totality as an outrage primarily directed against them.

The Impact of the Massacre

We cannot overemphasize how important was the impact that the seemingly unending discovery of thousands of decomposed and visibly tortured bodies had on many Ukrainians and Poles. Ukrainians in Poland had been used to everyday humiliations and discriminatory practices by the Polish authorities, and they had heard much about the famine of 1932-1933 and the Great Terror in Soviet Ukraine. But heaps of mangled, decomposing bodies, among which were their immediate relatives, many of whom lacked eyes, tongues, breasts, or genitalia, were something new. A Ukrainian eyewitness captures the horror of what he saw in his laconic testimony:

> I can well recall searching for the body of a Ukrainian patriot who was a close friend of mine, amongst the corpses. The marks of dreadful tortures were clearly visible on most of the bodies; broken arms and legs, or their eyes had been put out, and in the case of some of the women, their breasts had been cut off. Many of the prisoners had been killed by large nails

51 Here we distinguish between torturing a prisoner for information versus torturing someone for the sake of inflicting pain.

> driven through their nostrils into their brain, others by having their throats cut. In the prison yard three bodies were exhumed of persons who had apparently been buried alive.[52]

Although many Western Ukrainians had welcomed the Soviet invasion of Poland in September 1939, whatever enthusiasm they retained after the NKVD crackdowns of 1940-1941 quickly dissipated and turned into profound moral outrage at everything Soviet. Poles generally felt differently about interwar Poland and the Soviet-Nazi destruction of their state, frequently blaming Ukrainians and Jews for welcoming and participating in its destruction, but they too reacted with horror to the corpses, mutilations, and stench. After Germany attacked the USSR, according to Artur Wysocki, Poles 'relatively frequently' engaged in 'acts of revenge' against 'representatives' of national minorities, 'especially on persons actively engaged in anti-Polish activity' during the Soviet occupation of eastern Poland.[53]

Ukrainian and Polish outrage had two consequences. On the one hand, it enhanced Western Ukrainian enthusiasm for Germany, one that had its cultural roots in the Habsburg Empire where Ukrainians enjoyed cultural, religious, and educational privileges. Since the opening of the prisons coincided with Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union, it became as easy to associate Germany with liberation as the USSR with oppression (all the more so as strategic logic, which we discuss in greater detail below, dictated such a conclusion). On the other hand, Ukrainian and Polish hatred of the Soviets easily transferred to Jews. Importantly, anti-Jewish violence took place in what Elazar Barkan, Elizabeth Cole, and Kai Struve call a 'wave … that swept across the entire region between the Baltic and the Black Sea, which had been occupied by the Soviets in 1939/40 and now fell to the invading Germans and their allies.'[54]

There were several reasons for this transfer in Western Ukraine. First, the Nazi-Soviet division of Poland led some 200,000-300,000 Polish Jews to seek refuge from the Germans in Western Ukraine and Western Belarus.[55]

52 Mykola K.'s testimony in *Russian Oppression in Ukraine*, 193-94.

53 Wysocki, *Zderzenie kultur*, 276-78, 285.

54 Elazar Barkan, Elizabeth Cole, and Kai Struve, 'Introduction,' in *Shared History – Divided Memory*, 31. See also Roger Moorhouse, *The Devils' Alliance: Hitler's Pact with Stalin, 1939-1941* (New York: Basic Books, 2014), 272-75. Although Moorhouse notes that Soviet atrocities and anti-Jewish violence also occurred in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, he, too, fails to make a direct causal connection between the two.

55 Lower, *The Diary of Samuel Golfard and the Holocaust in Galicia*, 28. According to Lower (pp. 37-38), the Jewish population of the town of Peremyshliany doubled, from 3000 to 6000.

Many Jews were simple refugees; many had pro-Soviet sympathies. For many Ukrainians and Poles, their arrival, together with the Soviet arrival, seemed to confirm the widespread belief that Jews supported communism and the Soviet Union. Second, throughout the 1930s, the ranks of the Communist Party of Poland, the Communist Party of Western Ukraine, and the Soviet NKVD contained disproportionately large numbers of Jewish names.[56] Although most Jews were not communists or NKVD agents, the fact that most visible communists in interwar eastern Poland and many Soviet activists in 1939-1941 (and especially members of armed Soviet militias) were Jews[57] led many Ukrainians and Poles to the conclusion that Jews were responsible for the Massacre (a perception that blurs the question of whether the subsequent violence was directed at communists who happened to be Jews or at Jews as Jews).[58] Stefan Petelycky, a Ukrainian eyewitness from Zolochiv, conveys this perception well:

> We remembered all the Jews who had participated in the Soviet administration and had betrayed Ukrainian nationalists to the NKVD. We also held some of the Jews partly responsible for what had happened in that prison in the final weeks of the Soviet occupation. Local Jewish collaborators had helped the Soviets. It was not fair to blame all the Jews

56 Yuri Slezkine, *The Jewish Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 236-43, 254-55; Petrov and Skorkin, *Kto rukovodil NKVD, 1934-1941*, 495. As Petrov and Skorkin show, the high point of Jewish representation in the leading personnel of the NKVD came in 1936 (39.09 percent). The percentage progressively declined to 21.33 percent in late 1938; thereafter it dropped precipitously to 3.92 percent in mid-1939. Ukrainians and Poles based their perception that the NKVD was completely dominated by Russians and Jews on their experiences from the 1930s. As Gross notes with respect to Western Ukraine, 'there were proportionately more communist sympathizers among Jews than among any other nationality in the local population' (Gross, *Revolution from Abroad*, 32). Unsurprisingly, as Musial writes, the violence was directed 'not only against Jews, but also against those who had in some form collaborated with the Soviet occupiers. In the eyes of the local population, these people were co-responsible for the Soviet terror and for Soviet crimes' (Musial, *'Konterrevolutionäre Elemente sind zu erschießen,'* 175).

57 As Wendy Lower writes of the Jews of the Peremyshliany region: 'Most Jews in the area were educated and lived in the town; they were prime recruits for the Soviet administration. The communist ideology was also intellectually appealing and the Soviet state a better alternative to the antisemitic platforms of the radical nationalist movements in Poland, Ukraine, and Germany' (see Wendy Lower, 'Anti-Jewish Violence in Western Ukraine, Summer 1941: Varied Histories and Explanations,' in *The Holocaust in Ukraine: New Sources and Perspectives, Conference Presentations* (Washington, DC: Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2013), 144.

58 Given the predilection of communities to focus on their own tragedies, Ukrainians and Poles generally disregarded the fate of Jewish prisoners who had been massacred alongside members of their own national communities.

> for what had happened to our people. But you cannot imagine today what we saw in that prison yard. Think how you would feel to see the naked bodies of your loved ones, rotting in the heat, how you would react upon seeing how their flesh had been torn in chunks from their bodies by torture instruments … We buried our victims together in a mass grave on the following Sunday at the Ukrainian cemetery. We paid no heed to the deaths of their murderers or to the number of the innocent Jews who were killed alongside the guilty ones. Some of them had been our neighbours, even friends. But now they were consigned to the ranks of our enemies. It was not entirely rational. It was not just or fair. But war was already hardening us, stripping away such basic human instincts as empathy, understanding, and forgiveness.[59]

Third, some Poles and Ukrainians possessed distinctly anti-Semitic views and would have been inclined to associate Jews with evil. Fourth, the invading Nazi forces cleverly positioned themselves as champions of Ukrainian liberation from 'Judeo-Bolshevism'[60] and not only encouraged but usually initiated the anti-Jewish violence – an important point that meant that Poles and Ukrainians frequently joined in already ongoing violence rather than actually starting it. As Reinhard Heydrich, the Chief of the Security Police and the SD, stated on 29 June 1941, 'No obstacle is to be placed in the way of the self-cleansing efforts of anticommunist and anti-Jewish circles in the soon-to-be-occupied territories. On the contrary, these are to be aroused without a trace, intensified when necessary and directed in the right channels, so that these local "self-defense units" will not be

59 Stefan Petelycky, *Into Auschwitz, for Ukraine* (Kingston, ON: Kashtan Press, 1999), 12-13.

60 According to Snyder, 'Political calculation and local suffering do not entirely explain the participation in these pogroms. Violence against Jews served to bring the Germans and elements of the local non-Jewish population closer together. Anger was directed as the Germans wished, toward the Jews, rather than against collaborators with the Soviet regime as such. People who reacted to the Germans' urging knew that they were pleasing their new masters, whether or not they believed that the Jews were responsible for their own woes. By their actions they were confirming the Nazi worldview. The act of killing Jews as revenge for NKVD executions confirmed the Nazi understanding of the Soviet Union as a Jewish state. Violence against Jews also allowed local Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Poles who had themselves cooperated with the Soviet regime to escape any such taint. The idea that only Jews served communists was convenient not just for the occupiers but for some of the occupied as well. Yet this psychic nazification would have been much more difficult without the palpable evidence of Soviet atrocities. The pogroms took place where the Soviets had recently arrived and where Soviet power was recently installed, where for the previous months Soviet organs of coercion had organized arrests, executions, and deportations. They were a joint production, a Nazi edition of a Soviet text' (Snyder, *Bloodlands*, 196).

able to refer to orders or stated political assurances.'[61] Edmund Kessler, a Jewish eyewitness highly critical of Ukrainians, goes so far as to say that 'the Germans were the conductors of all this. They decided when to begin a pogrom, when to end it, and how long the victims should be tormented.'[62]

Fifth, suspicion of and hostility to Jews had been reinforced by the fact that, for much of the period of Poland's independence, the Ukrainian, Polish, and Jewish communities lived side by side without much interaction, and with little mutual understanding of or sympathy for one another's views. Sixth, nationally based suspicions were reinforced, or possibly even rooted in, religious and class differences: the resulting 'overlapping cleavages,' to use a social science term from the literature on ethnic violence, made ethnic conflict between and among all three communities a permanent possibility.[63] Seventh, to borrow a concept from John A. Armstrong and Anthony D. Smith, the three communities had incompatible 'mythomoteurs' that, if ignited, could result in conflict.[64] Finally, all these combustible factors were at play at a time of war, violence, brutality, fear, and chaos – conditions that are neither conducive to dispassionate fact collecting and rational thought by people living in them nor familiar to comfortably situated academics attempting to develop simple schemes of human behavior under extreme stress. Indeed, as Wysocki points out, the Soviet occupation of eastern Poland had already produced anti-Polish violence in 1939-1940, oftentimes promoted by communists and poor peasants hoping to settle scores.[65] In sum, the ethnic violence that followed the Massacre was a product of a variety of factors embedded in the ethnic relations between and among Poles, Ukrainians, and Jews – and not the simple effect of a single cause.

We leave it to historians, sociologists, anthropologists, and political scientists to decide how these multiple factors played themselves out on the ground after Nazi Germany occupied Western Ukraine. However, it seems clear that Ukrainian and Polish participation in anti-Jewish violence

61 Heydrich, Telegram to the commanding officers of the Einsatzgruppe (Arthur Nebe (B), Otto Ohlendorf (D), Otto Rasch (C), and Franz Walter Stahlecker (A)), dated 29 June 1941, *Die Einsatzgruppen in der besetzten Sowjetunion 1941/42. Die Tätigkeits- und Lageberichte des Chefs der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD*, ed. Peter Klein (Berlin: Edition Hentrich, 1997), 319.

62 Edmund Kessler, *Przeżyć Holokaust we Lwowie* (Warsaw: Żydowski Instytut Historyczny, 2007), 33.

63 For excellent discussions of ethnic conflict, see Joseph Rothschild, *Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), and Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).

64 John A. Armstrong, *Nations before Nationalism* (Durham: University of North Carolina Press, 1982); Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).

65 Wysocki, *Zderzenie kultur*, 277-79.

and subsequent indifference to German persecution of Jews were 'sparked' by the outrage that the Massacre both reinforced and created. Revealingly, Kessler points out that the Ukrainian 'militia men shouted during the beatings [of Jews] that this was in response for their brothers and sisters murdered by the NKVD.'[66]

The literature on the role of emotions in social movements and collective action can be very useful here. A 'moral shock' – which James M. Jasper defines as 'an unexpected event or piece of information [that] raises such a sense of outrage in a person that she becomes inclined toward political action'[67] – can, given the appropriate moral, cognitive, and emotional context, both produce action and reinforce a We versus Them identity.[68] As James B. Rule points out, 'shared emotional states have force of their own in explaining the outbreak and subsidence of violent action … News of atrocities to a particular group, for example, may move members of the group to violent actions that would never otherwise have occurred. Such sequences are highly unlikely, however, in the absence of enduring tensions or clashes of interest that establish targets of such action.'[69]

In light of the importance that social science theories of emotion, violence, rebellion, and revolution assign to moral outrage in general and outrageous 'sparks' in particular,[70] the 'null hypothesis' must be that the Massacre played an important causal role. Hence, the burden of proof falls on scholars who disagree. Indeed, we believe that the Massacre was the sufficient (as well as the necessary) condition of the widespread anti-Jewish violence that followed: that is, without the Massacre, *widespread* violence could not have occurred, and, with the Massacre conjoined to the other

66 Kessler, *Przeżyć Holokaust we Lwowie*, 35.

67 James M. Jasper, 'The Emotions of Protest: Affective and Reactive Emotions in and around Social Movements,' *Sociological Forum* 13, no. 3 (September 1998): 409. See also Roger D. Petersen, *Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

68 See Ivan Gomza and Nadiia Koval, 'The Winter of Our Discontent: Emotions and Contentious Politics in Ukraine during Euromaidan,' *Kyiv-Mohyla Law and Politics Journal* 1 (2015): 39-62; James M. Jasper, *The Art of Moral Protest: Culture, Biography, and Creativity in Social Movements* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 23-29; Elisabeth Jean Wood, 'The Emotional Benefits of Insurgency in El Salvador,' in *Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements*, ed. Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 272-73.

69 James B. Rule, *Theories of Civil Violence* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 268. See also Barrington Moore, Jr., *Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt* (New York: Random House, 1979).

70 See Ekkart Zimmermann, *Political Violence, Crises, and Revolutions: Theories and Research* (London: Routledge, 2011).

factors listed above, *widespread* violence had to occur. (Nazi occupation policies and hostility to Jews were necessary conditions. The other factors qualify as facilitating.) It should go without saying that to explain hostility or indifference is not to 'blame' Jews, 'exonerate' their persecutors, or 'justify' pogroms.

Alexander V. Prusin argues that outrage could not have played an explanatory role, because anti-Jewish violence was excessive and also occurred in places where there were no prisons and no corpses: 'Although the NKVD massacres certainly contributed to the popular desire to punish the culprits, the extreme brutality against defenseless men, women, and children transcended any notion of score-settling. This is especially revealing since the real perpetrators were long gone, and violence also erupted in localities where no NKVD killings had taken place.'[71] We beg to differ with this assessment. Without in any way suggesting that violence justifies violence, we wish to underline that the unimaginable horror of the 10,000-40,000 corpses, stench, and mutilations was more than 'equivalent' to the extreme brutality that followed. Moreover, Prusin overlooks the fact that the uncovering of the corpses occurred in a rolling wave in the course of about a week. As prisons, pits, and ditches were uncovered and corpses were discovered, news and rumors – whether with respect to Ukrainian nationalist complicity in the mutilations or Jewish responsibility for the deaths – spread to other localities. With time, it is reasonable to assume that all of Western Ukraine was seething with anger at the Soviets and their perceived henchmen, 'the' Jews. Poles and Ukrainians felt outrage and revulsion, because the killings were directed at their nation, their community, and hence indirectly at them and their families.[72]

71 Alexander V. Prusin, 'A "Zone of Violence": The Anti-Jewish Pogroms in Eastern Galicia in 1914-1915 and 1941,' in *Shatterzone of Empires: Coexistence and Violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman Borderlands*, ed. Omer Bartov and Eric D. Weitz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 372.

72 Since all human beings are presumably more or less equally susceptible to outrage, the moral outrage thesis we are propounding leads us to expect all social strata to have been affected. Lower agrees: 'According to Philip Friedman's pioneering research, the involvement of Ukrainians cut across class, educational, generational, and political lines.... This cross section of society contained "fringe" criminal elements or ruffians, thugs, and rabble-rousers, but these types were not the dominant force in summer 1941' (Lower, 'Anti-Jewish Violence in Western Ukraine, Summer 1941,' 146-47). We suspect that 'ruffians, thugs, and rabble-rousers' were more dominant than Lower claims, as there are too many eyewitness accounts to this effect to be easily ignored. Unfortunately, Lower appears to misunderstand Friedman who speaks of 'the aroused mob' and 'an inflamed populace' and states that the pogroms 'were mainly wild, spontaneous outbursts of the urban or rural population' (Philip Friedman, *Roads to Extinction: Essays on the*

The Massacre had other important consequences for the Ukrainian, Polish, and Jewish populations. As Ihor Derev'ianyi demonstrates in his study of the massacres in L'viv, the Ukrainian prisoners were generally young (under the age of 30) and nationally conscious, oftentimes members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists.[73] Since the established Ukrainian political and cultural elites had been largely destroyed by the Soviets in 1940-1941, the Massacre effectively resulted in the decapitation of Ukrainian elites. Similarly destructive tendencies also affected the Polish and Jewish communities. It is therefore not surprising that none of them engaged in full-scale resistance to the Nazis until one to two years after the occupation: all three communities lacked the organizational wherewithal and the personnel, both leaders and followers. Western Ukrainians, of course, were also disinclined to resist immediately, inasmuch as they expected German occupation to bring liberation and independence. But even when it became manifestly clear by the late summer of 1941 that German intentions were at odds with Ukrainian national expectations and the Nazis cracked down on the OUN, Ukrainian society in general and the nationalist underground in particular required another year before they could engage in resistance.

The Ukrainian, Polish, and Jewish Dimensions

The Great West Ukrainian Prison Massacre of 1941 came to have very different meanings for Ukrainians, Poles, and Jews. The Massacre fit into their 'victimization narratives' and strategic logics differently, thereby affecting their subsequent behavior and memories differently.[74]

The Massacre is central to Ukrainian attitudes in general and Western Ukrainian attitudes in particular toward World War II, Germany, the Soviet Union, and Jews. For many Ukrainians, the Massacre – and especially the gratuitous torture of prisoners – appeared to confirm the indispensability of war against the Soviet Union, the liberation promised by Germany, the evil of communism, and Jewish complicity in Soviet crimes. Although the fact that the vast majority of the dead were Ukrainian was a function of Ukrainians' comprising the vast majority of prisoners at that point in

Holocaust (New York: Conference on Jewish Social Studies, 1980), 184-85). Friedman (pp. 192-93) also acknowledges the limitations of his primary sources.

73 Derev'ianyi, 'Masovi rozstrily u v'iaznytsi,' 98-99.

74 Wysocki discusses the strategic logics of Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Jews in 1939 (see Wysocki, *Zderzenie kultur*, 271).

time, Ukrainians, unsurprisingly, interpreted the Massacre as specifically directed against them. The sight of heaps of decaying bodies, the intolerable all-pervasive smell, and the obvious bodily mutilations went well beyond the kind of repressive measures they had experienced under Poland or heard about in the USSR. The physicality of the rotting flesh and the shocking mutilations represented a qualitatively different reminder of the precariousness of Ukrainian existence. That physicality was also an outrage, one that evoked an equally physical, 'gut' response from many Ukrainians. Significantly, even after Ukrainian nationalists launched an armed struggle against the Germans in Western Ukraine in 1942, the Soviet Union remained their primary enemy. Hostility to the Soviets was overdetermined for many Western Ukrainians, but the memory of the Massacre was certainly one of the reasons that the relentless Soviet advance after Stalingrad appeared to portend, not just occupation, but slaughter.

Moreover, the overall Ukrainian experience with the Soviet Union is incomprehensible without appreciation of the Massacre. The creation of Soviet Ukraine united Ukrainians in a single state structure, but it also devastated the population, particularly during the 1930s and 1940s, when Joseph Stalin and his accomplices systematically destroyed the political and cultural life of Ukraine in four stages. First came the genocide of 1930-1933, during which tens of thousands of political, cultural, and religious elites were killed and about 4 million peasants were intentionally starved in the Holodomor.[75] Then came the Great Terror of 1937-1938, during which, according to Werth, 270,000 Ukrainians were repressed and 125,000-130,000 were executed.[76] Next came the Prison Massacre of 1941. The final stage came in the immediate aftermath of World War II, when hundreds of thousands of Western Ukrainians were killed or deported during the Soviet assault on the nationalist resistance movement.[77] (In the interim, of course, Nazi extermination policies led to the deaths of millions of Ukrainian Jews, and Nazi occupation policies produced the deaths of millions of ethnic

75 Omelian Rudnytskyi, Nataliia Levchuk, Oleh Wolowyna, Pavlo Shevchuk, and Alla Savchuk, 'Demography of a Man-made Human Catastrophe: The Case of Massive Famine in Ukraine 1932-1933,' *Canadian Studies in Population* 42, nos. 1-2 (2015): 53-80; Jacques Vallin et al., 'The Great Famine: Population Losses in Ukraine,' in *A Sourcebook on the Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine*, ed. Bohdan Klid and Alexander J. Motyl (Edmonton; Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2012), 54-59, and Oleh Wolowyna, 'The Famine-Genocide of 1932-33: Estimation of Losses and Demographic Impact,' in *The Holodomor Reader*, 59-64.

76 Nicolas Werth, paper presented at the Ukrainian-Jewish Encounter Initiative Meeting, Ditchley Park, Oxford, UK, 14-16 December 2009.

77 Levchuk et al., 'Ukraina stradaet.'

Ukrainians.[78]) Although it is a fact that the Soviet authorities systematically destroyed Ukrainians, no less important is the fact that many Ukrainians came to view Soviet policy toward them as being systematically destructive.

The longer-term Polish historical encounter with the Soviet Union (and Russia) was quite similar to that of Ukrainians. First came the Miracle on the Vistula of 1920, when Polish armed forces repulsed the Red Army outside Warsaw. Next came the persecution of Soviet Poles during Stalin's repressions in the late 1930s, when, according to Snyder, 'ethnic Poles suffered more than any other group within the Soviet Union during the Great Terror.'[79] There followed the Katyń massacres in 1940 and the Great West Ukrainian Prison Massacre of 1941. Not surprisingly, many Poles, like many Ukrainians, came to view Soviet policy toward them as systematically destructive. But there was one crucial contextual difference. Since Ukrainians could point to few instances of bona fide statehood in their past, they interpreted Soviet/Russian behavior as directed against their nation and its existence. In contrast, Poles were more likely to interpret Soviet/Russian policy as directed against their state, which had been destroyed twice, first by Russia (together with Prussia and the Habsburg Empire) at the end of the eighteenth century, and then by the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany in 1939. Both Ukrainian and Polish victimization narratives were therefore anti-Soviet and anti-Russian, but the former focused on the nation while the latter emphasized the state. As we have already argued, both narratives tended to view Jews as victimizers as well.

Interwar Polish and Ukrainian attitudes toward the Soviet Union differed from those of many Jews. Jewish victimization narratives drew on the Jewish historical experience of discrimination and pogroms and frequently assigned the victimizer role to Poles and Ukrainians with their supposed predilection for a primordial form of anti-Semitism. Moreover, many Jews viewed the Soviet Union as a hopeful experiment that promised to eradicate discrimination, anti-Jewish prejudice, and ethnic violence. As Snyder argues, Poles and Ukrainians were the 'losers' during much of the interwar period in the USSR, figuring very prominently among the victims of Stalinism. In contrast, as Yuri Slezkine demonstrates, Russians and Jews were the 'winners,' figuring very prominently among Soviet officialdom, especially within the upper echelons of the coercive agencies.[80] Unsurprisingly, many

78 Ibid.

79 Snyder, *Bloodlands*, 103-4.

80 According to Slezkine, 'the Soviet secret police – the regime's sacred center, known after 1934 as the NKVD – was one of the most Jewish of all Soviet institutions. In January 1937, on the

Jews (and Ukrainians) welcomed the Soviet invasion of Poland in 1939. For Jews, Soviet power meant the promise of equality. For Ukrainians, Soviet power meant national liberation. For Poles, of course, the Soviet invasion was the second time that Russia had destroyed the Polish state.

Victimization narratives were affected by the fact that Poles and Ukrainians knew and understood each other and Jews as little as Jews knew and understood Ukrainians and Poles. As Shimon Redlich rightly says, the three communities lived 'together and apart' in interwar Poland[81] – a point also made persuasively by Wysocki, Rafał Wnuk, and Christoph Mick.[82] In an ethnically segmented environment such as this, it was easy for all three sides to view one another through the lens of their own fears, hopes, expectations, and interests. As the selections in this book make clear, Jewish eyewitness accounts of the first days of the German occupation tend to downplay the awfulness of the Massacre and instead focus on the violence Jews experienced in its aftermath. Invariably, that violence is seen as a precursor, and within the context, of the Holocaust, a discursive move that reduces the Massacre to a footnote of the Shoah. Ukrainian eyewitness accounts emphasize the uniquely Ukrainian dimension of the Massacre and downplay the anti-Jewish violence. Polish accounts downplay both the Ukrainian dimension of the Massacre and the pogroms and emphasize their own traumatic experiences of sudden arrest, conscription, and forced deportations. This is not a conspiracy of morally obtuse communities – after all, if victims of one atrocity feel terribly victimized, they are not necessarily denying the terribleness of atrocities in which they were not

eve of the Great Terror, the 111 top NKVD officials included 42 Jews, 35 Russians, 8 Latvians, and 26 others. Out of twenty NKVD directorates, twelve (60 percent, including State Security, Police, Labor Camps, and Resettlement [deportations]) were headed by officers who identified themselves as ethnic Jews. The most exclusive and sensitive of all NKVD agencies, the Main Directorate for State Security, consisted of ten departments: seven of them (Protection of Government Officials, Counterintelligence, Secret-Political, Special [surveillance in the army], Foreign Intelligence, Records, and Prisons) were run by immigrants from the former Pale of Settlement. Foreign service was an almost exclusively Jewish specialty (as was spying for the Soviet Union in Western Europe and especially in the United States). The Gulag, or Main Labor Camp Administration, was headed by ethnic Jews from 1930, when it was formed, until late November 1938, when the Great Terror was mostly over' (Slezkine, *The Jewish Century*, 254-55).

81 Shimon Redlich, *Together and Apart in Brzezany: Poles, Jews, and Ukrainians, 1919-1945* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002).

82 Wysocki, *Zderzenie kultur*, 269-85; Rafał Wnuk, *'Za pierwszego Sowieta': polska konspiracja na Kresach Wschodnich II Rzeczypospolitej (wrzesień 1939-czerwiec 1941)* (Warsaw: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu, 2007), 365-67; and Christoph Mick, 'Incompatible Experiences: Poles, Ukrainians and Jews in Lviv under Soviet and German Occupation, 1939-44,' *Journal of Contemporary History* 46, no. 2 (April 2011): 336-63.

victimized – but a fairly typical example of how solidary communities naturally remember their own tragedies more than those of their neighbors.

We see these dynamics play out in Piotr Wróbel's description of the 1941 pogrom in the town of Boryslav:

> According to most Polish authors of oral and written testimonies, the Jews were brought to the former NKVD building by the Ukrainian militia, which assisted in unearthing and cleaning the bodies from the very beginning. The Jews were killed by the militia men, instructed and encouraged by the Wehrmacht officers and soldiers, participating in all the atrocities; by local Ukrainians and by Ukrainian peasants, who came to the town with axes and forks … According to the dominant Ukrainian version, [it was] not the Ukrainian militia but the relatives of the murdered people [who] brought the Jews. Local hoodlums started beating them and robbing their houses, and since Poles were more numerous in the town than Ukrainians, they dominated numerically also among the murderers … Also, the Jews believed that the Germans gave a free hand to the locals to start a pogrom and instructed them how to treat the Jews. Most Jewish testimonies indicate that the Ukrainians, helped, instructed, and photographed by the Germans, dominated among those carrying out the pogrom. Some Jews recall, however, that Poles also participated … Soon many different rumors appeared among Poles, Ukrainians, and Jews.[83]

Wróbel's analysis of Polish, Ukrainian, and Jewish memories of the Boryslav pogrom reinforces the point (as do, albeit inadvertently, many Jewish Holocaust narratives) that all three nationalities most clearly remembered the trauma that most affected their own community.

It is precisely because Poles, Ukrainians, and Jews viewed the Massacre through the lens of their own victimhood that the tragedy came to assume very different roles in the strategic logics of all three groups' 'national interests' vis-à-vis the USSR and Germany. In talking about strategic logics, we

83 Piotr Wróbel, 'Polish-Ukrainian Relations during World War II: The Boryslav Case Study: A Polish Perspective,' *East European Politics and Societies* 26, no. 1 (February 2012): 225. It is not for us to resolve the issue of whose role in the Boryslav or any other pogrom is greater. Suffice to say that, when two sets of accounts differ diametrically, it may be the case that both Poles and Ukrainians were implicated more or less equally in the anti-Jewish violence – not because any one side had some greater genetic (and therefore racist) disposition to bestiality or mendacity, but because both were equally affected by what they perceived as mass killing directed above all against their community.

are moving from the lived experience of actual individuals to the analytical claim – one quite similar to the claims made about national interests by the realist school of international relations studies[84] – that their interests as self-defined groups with common experiences implied certain rational behaviors that may have been at odds with their perceptions.[85]

Thus, despite the shared experience by Ukrainians and Poles – repressions, deportations, arrests, killings, and the eventual Massacre – these mutual sufferings did not unite them against the Soviets, and certainly not against the Germans. Although the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany had destroyed the Polish state in 1939, Operation Barbarossa immediately transformed the Soviets into a strategic ally of Poland in its struggle against Nazi imperialism and for a restoration of its pre-1939 state borders – all the more so as the USSR became an ally of the Western democracies. As a result, the Polish government-in-exile begrudgingly downplayed the Massacre and on 17 August 1941 signed the Sikorski-Maisky Pact with the Soviet Union, thereby invalidating the 1939 Soviet-Nazi partition of Poland and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. In time, the Soviets even permitted a Polish army under General Władysław Anders to be established on Soviet territory.

For nationally conscious Western Ukrainians who aspired to an independent Ukrainian state, Germany was the obvious ally that promised liberation from enslavement by the Stalinist regime.[86] The Western democracies had been hostile to Ukrainian aspirations in the interwar period, as these aspirations were premised on a revision of Polish and Czechoslovak boundaries – something that only Germany and its allies welcomed. The democracies remained equally hostile to Ukrainian nationalism during the war, as many Ukrainians viewed the West's Soviet ally as a greater threat to them than Germany.

84 See, in particular, Barry R. Posen, 'The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,' *Survival* 35, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 27-47.

85 Subtelny argues along similar lines: 'For the Balts, Belorussians, and Ukrainians, foreign occupation during World War II presented a more complex problem than for the other occupied nations of Europe. Some tried to resist both the Nazis and the Soviets. (The Ukrainian Insurgent Army is a case in point.) Others considered this policy unrealistic and argued for the need, no matter how distasteful, of siding with one totalitarian regime in order to withstand the other. Since the Soviets had already occupied their lands once and were about to do so again, they were perceived by many Eastern Europeans as the greater long-term threat; hence the Baltic, Belorussian, and Ukrainian units that fought in the German army on the anti-Soviet front' (Subtelny, 'The Soviet Occupation,' 6).

86 See Alexander J. Motyl, 'The Ukrainian Nationalist Movement and the Jews: Theoretical Reflections on Nationalism, Fascism, Rationality, Primordialism and History,' *Polin* 26 (2013): 275-95.

The national interest of Jews as a group was virtually identical to that of Poles as a group and directly antithetical to that of Ukrainians as a group. For Jews, there could be no question that Nazi Germany was hostile to their national aspirations and their very existence. *Faute de mieux*, the Soviets were the main strategic ally of Jews and Poles, just as the Soviets were the main strategic enemy of Ukrainians.

It is tragic but unsurprising that Poles and Jews on the one hand and Western Ukrainians on the other failed to find common cause during World War II. For starters, their strategic interests were contradictory. Moreover, trust, which is indispensable to any collective action, was almost nonexistent: the frequently incompatible memories Poles, Jews, and Ukrainians had of the interwar years were too deeply engrained, and enmities too deeply entrenched, to allow for mutual understanding and coordinated opposition to the occupation regimes. Finally, with the intellectual elites and moral authorities of all three nations for the most part deported or executed, there were few moderate leaders able and willing to form a jointly led campaign against their oppressors. More puzzling is that, despite their common strategic interests, Poles and Jews also failed to find common cause during the war. A possible reason for that failure was suggested by Gross's book[87] on the Polish pogrom of July 1941 in Jedwabne, in which he attributes the anti-Jewish violence to Polish anti-Semitism – a view that has caused a storm of controversy in Poland and elsewhere.[88]

Methodological Errors

We have noted that there are serious methodological difficulties with some of the scholarly work dealing with the Massacre. We focus on three. First is the tendency to ascribe the ethnic violence against Jews to primordial anti-Semitism or to Ukrainian nationalists. The second is to suggest that the corpses of NKVD victims were mutilated by Ukrainian nationalists. The third is to ascribe the violence to 'the' Ukrainians or 'the' Poles. All three methodological errors tend to go together, forming a dehumanized image of Ukrainians (and less frequently Poles) in general and Ukrainian nationalists in particular as being driven by an essentialist savagery and a

87 Jan Tomasz Gross, *Sąsiedzi: historia zagłady żydowskiego miasteczka* (Sejny: Pogranicze, 2000); trans. into English as *Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).

88 Barkan, Cole, and Struve, 'Introduction,' 23-33.

primordial anti-Semitism. Needless to say, this representation, which is a mirror image of anti-Semitism and racism more generally, is inappropriate for academic discourse.

With respect to anti-Semitism's explanatory power, we reject explanations of Jewish, Polish, and Ukrainian behavior in terms of simplistic underlying, unchanging, essentialist impulses.[89] People are the products of a whole range of factors, and their attitudes and behaviors are as much attempts to change their environment as they are responses to that environment. Moreover, anti-Semitism, if it is indeed an unchanging, primordial impulse, explains nothing, for the simple reason that it claims to explain everything. In the social sciences and humanities, monocausal explanations of everything are epistemologically useless. Situational anti-Semitism – a disposition that somehow emerges at different times and in different places – is no less useless methodologically, as it begs the unanswerable questions of where it came from and why it emerged at one point in time and not some other. Enhancing the explanatory inadequacy of anti-Semitism is a serious definitional problem. Identifying the extent and causal importance of anti-Semitism in Western Ukraine – or anywhere, for that matter – presupposes a rigorous definition of the phenomenon. Unfortunately, the concept is used so loosely as to encompass everything from the hateful ravings of street thugs to the elaborate theories of Alfred Rosenberg to the dismissive mutterings of babushkas to the everyday dispositions of people who live together and apart. Such concept stretching is, obviously, of little analytical utility.

To understand why 'innate' anti-Semitism explains almost nothing, consider it in terms of conditional analysis. Anti-Semitism cannot be a sufficient condition of violence against Jews, for the simple reason that, if it were sufficient, then pogroms would have to be a permanent state of affairs, and not clustered in occasional outbursts. Anti-Semitism, like any other racist disposition involving the belief in some group's lack of humanity, cannot even be a necessary condition of violence, because, if it were, no violence against Jews or others could occur in the absence of anti-Semitism

89 Lower constructs just such a primordial narrative by arguing that '[t]hree centuries later, the memory of Khmel'nyts'kyi's campaigns resonated in the Ukrainian-Polish-Jewish violence in the German-occupied forests and villages of eastern Galicia' (Lower, *Diary of Samuel Golfard*, 30). There is, and can be, no empirical evidence of this remarkable claim. On the perils of essentialism, see Andriy Zavarnyuk, 'A Revolution's History, a Historians' War,' *Ab Imperio* 16, no. 1 (2015): 449-79, and Dariusz Skórczewski, 'Between Clichés and Erasure: Eastern and Central Non-Germanic Europe as an "Empty Syntagm" in Contemporary Political Discourse,' *The Sarmatian Review* 35, no. 2 (April 2015): 1919-31.

or other prejudicial dispositions. But we know, empirically, that even people with the best of dispositions can commit violence against others: after all, 'the road to hell is paved with good intentions.' These considerations therefore transform anti-Semitism into a facilitating condition of violence: that is, anti-Semitism, like any prejudice, makes violence more likely.[90]

Ascribing the ethnic violence against Jews in the aftermath of the Massacre to Ukrainian nationalists fails for several reasons, not the least of which is that, first, it constructs a simplistic bogeyman and thereby distracts attention from the complexity of interethnic social relations. In general, this approach simply transposes the (relatively few) anti-Semitic statements or writings of (mostly émigré) nationalists and nationalist intellectuals to rank-and-file nationalists in Western Ukraine, without asking whether the latter even read and assimilated these writings and what the sources of their attitudes to Jews and other ethnic groups were. Second, Poles took part in the pogroms, and it makes little sense to claim that they were incited by their political adversaries, Ukrainian nationalists. (And in Belarus, Lithuania, and Latvia, Belarusians, Lithuanians, and Latvians – who were obviously not Ukrainian nationalists – also took part in pogroms.) Third, the accounts of many Jewish eyewitnesses and survivors emphasize that many of the people engaged in anti-Jewish violence were youngsters and peasants armed with primitive instruments, while Ukrainian accounts often stress that the perpetrators were hooligans and other 'scum.'[91] Mick notes that,

90 According to Timothy Snyder, 'Without Hitler's anti-Semitism, his understanding and presentation of Jews as a global threat to Germany, the Holocaust would not have happened. To say so is to specify a necessary condition for the German attempt to exterminate the Jews of Europe. But a plausible historical explanation of any significant historical event must be plural, entangling in prose multiple lines of causality that together are not only necessary but *sufficient*. For the purposes of explaining the Holocaust, then, anti-Semitism is not enough; for the purposes of its commemoration, however, it is: and the bad news is that ours is an age of memory rather history. Commemoration requires no adequate explanation of the catastrophe, only an aesthetically realizable image of its victims. As cultures of memory supplant concern for history, the danger is that historians will find themselves drawn to explanations that are the simplest to convey' (Snyder, 'Commemorative Causality,' *Modernism/modernity* 20, no. 1 (January 2013): 77).

91 The moderate Ukrainian politician, Kost' Pan'kivs'kyi, wrote: 'Starting on 1 July, anti-Jewish excesses went through the city [L'viv] on the initiative of the German army.... The urban scum exploited this opportunity and joined this action.... [T]his scum [was] almost exclusively Polish, robbed and beat Jews, wore blue-and-yellow insignia, and tried to speak Ukrainian. I personally experienced such actions when the street toughs attacked our Jewish and non-Jewish coworkers' (Kost' Pan'kivs'kyi, *Vid derzhavy do Komitetu* (New York; Toronto: Kliuchi, 1957), 35-36). Pan'kivs'kyi, a critic of the OUN, is credible, and his claim that he 'personally experienced such instances' has to be taken seriously.

'As in most pogroms, an important motivation was greed. The Jews were not only beaten, but also robbed and blackmailed.'[92] Dr. Joachim Herman Allerhand of L'viv, for instance, was robbed of 250 rubles, his watch, and hat; his attackers also tried to take his shoes.[93] Kessler claims that the 'thieving bands' consisted 'primarily of illiterates.'[94] Mędykowski, meanwhile, stresses that many Soviet collaborators became enthusiastic German collaborators in order to hide their past.[95] Although it is possible for such elements to be nationalists, children, violence-prone peasants, thugs, petty thieves, illiterates, and Soviet collaborators were not the pools from which the OUN recruited its cadres.

Fourth, as Snyder points out,

> A significant (and successful) effort has been made to document the role of Ukrainian nationalists in the Holocaust. But it is perfectly clear that this demonstration is chiefly of moral rather than practical importance. It means that Ukrainian nationalists do not have clean hands, which is not a great surprise; it does not at all mean that the Germans needed Ukrainian nationalists in order to perpetrate a Holocaust. In central and eastern Ukraine, which is to say in the occupied Soviet Union, Ukrainian nationalism was of little significance as a sentiment and no significance as a political movement. Yet here, as in the rest of the occupied Soviet Union, the Germans had no trouble finding local assistance and the murder rates of Jews were as high as, or higher than, in western Ukraine.[96]

Fifth, the Bandera wing of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-B) explicitly called on Ukrainians to eschew pogroms against Jews at its Second Great Congress, held in Kraków just two months before the Massacre – in April 1941.[97] This resolution does not necessarily mean that

92 Mick, 'Incompatible Experiences,' 351.

93 Maurycy Allerhand and Leszek Allerhand, *Zapiski z tamtego świata* (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Edukacyjne, 2003), 37.

94 Kessler, *Przeżyć Holokaust we Lwowie*, 35.

95 Mędykowski, *W cieniu gigantów*, 160.

96 Snyder, 'Commemorative Causality,' 83-84.

97 'The Jews in the USSR are the most faithful prop of the ruling Bolshevik regime and the vanguard of Muscovite imperialism in Ukraine. The Muscovite-Bolshevik government uses the anti-Jewish sentiments of the Ukrainian masses to divert their attention from the true cause of their misfortune and to direct them at a time of upheaval into carrying out pogroms against Jews. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists combats the Jews as a prop of the Muscovite-Bolshevik regime, while simultaneously making the masses conscious of the fact that Moscow is the principal enemy' (*OUN v svitli postanov Velykykh zboriv, konferentsii ta inshykh*

the call was followed by individual members of the OUN-B, but it does mean that violence was not part of its declared program – especially at a time that promoting ethnic violence against Jews openly would have enhanced the nationalists' standing with Germany. Sixth, the primary goal of the nationalists was to seize power in Western Ukraine and to present the invading Germans with a *fait accompli*: it made little strategic sense for them to sow chaos by systematically engaging in ethnic violence in a region they were hoping to control. And seventh, it begs credulity to suggest that the nationalists who arrived in Western Ukraine from the Generalgouvernement purposely timed their entry into scores of localities with the uncovering by the local populations of the NKVD's victims.[98]

To repeat: we are not claiming that members of the OUN were not involved in the violence; nor are we claiming that the OUN's attitude toward Jews was benign.[99] We are insisting only that to blame the violence on 'the' nationalists does as little justice to the complexity of the Ukrainian

dokumentiv z borot'by 1929-1955 r. (Munich: Zakordonni chastyny Orhanizatsiï ukraïns'kykh natsionalistiv, 1955), 36).

98 The most concerted empirical effort to argue for the OUN's complicity in the killings, by John-Paul Himka ('The Lviv Pogrom of 1941'), signally fails to make a persuasive case, preferring to resort to highly circumstantial evidence and dubious inference. Himka's effort has been the target of a devastating point-by-point rebuttal by the Ukrainian scholar, Serhii Riabenko, who convincingly demonstrates that Himka consistently misinterprets facts, resolves ambiguities in favor of his thesis, and misuses his sources (Riabenko, 'Slidamy "L'vivs'koho pohromu" Dzhona-Pola Khymky,' *Ukraïns'kyi vyzvol'nyi rukh* 18 (2013): 258-328). Another striking example of evidence stretching is found in Lower (*Diary of Samuel Golfard*, 5), who selectively cites the Ukrainian nationalist ideologue, Dmytro Dontsov, in order to make her point about some transhistorical, essentialist Ukrainian anti-Semitism. Dontsov, according to Lower, said the following: 'The Jews are guilty, horribly guilty, because they were the ones who helped secure Russian rule in Ukraine.' Lower adds a period where there is none in the original text, failing to acknowledge that Dontsov's sentence continues and, together with the next sentence, contradicts the selection she cites: '… but – the "Jew is not guilty of everything". Russian imperialism is guilty of everything' (Alexander J. Motyl, *The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919-1929* (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1980), 73). No less important, just how Dontsov's sentiment, expressed in an intellectual journal in 1925, came to influence popular attitudes in Galicia in 1941 remains a mystery.

99 At the same time, the OUN's attitude toward Jews was complex and constantly evolving. One cannot easily reduce it to anti-Semitism. See Volodymyr V'iatrovych, *Stavlennia OUN do ievreïv: formuvannia pozytsiï na tli katastrofy* (L'viv: Vyd-vo 'Ms,' 2006), 50-86.

nationalist movement[100] as it fails to serve as a persuasive explanation of something as complex as interethnic violence.[101]

100 Dieter Pohl, for instance, feels emboldened to encapsulate the OUN with just three modifiers: 'authoritarian, anti-Semitic, underground movement' ('The Holocaust in Ukraine: History – Historiography – Memory,' in *Stalin and Europe: Imitation and Domination, 1928-1953*, ed. Timothy Snyder and Ray Brandon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 192). In fact, OUN's attitude – as expressed in official resolutions or the published writings of individual, mostly émigré members (who may or may not have reflected the views of the younger rank and file in Poland that spent much of the 1930s in Polish prisons) – toward authoritarianism and Jews varied significantly over time. The attitude of its actual living members in Galicia have not been researched with any thoroughness. Nor was the movement in the underground: the vast majority of its members lived normal, open lives. Pohl appears to mean that it was illegal and that, as a result, its members could not openly admit to their affiliation with it. See V'iatrovych, *Stavlennia OUN do ievreïv*, and Motyl, 'The Ukrainian Nationalist Movement and the Jews.'

101 Consider in this light Omer Bartov's laudable attempt at being evenhanded: 'Observing the dynamics of communal genocide through a local perspective reveals that not a few of those who perpetrated violence at one point became its victims at another. Ukrainian nationalists collaborated with the Germans in killing Jews and massacred Poles; they were in turn targeted by the prewar Polish state, the Soviet authorities, and eventually also the Germans. Poles benefited from their prewar state's discriminatory anti-Jewish and anti-Ukrainian policies; in turn they were subjected to Soviet deportations and Ukrainian ethnic cleansing. Jewish community leaders and educated youths tried to save themselves by becoming complicit in the victimization of poorer and weaker fellow Jews, only to have their illusions of power and security dispelled as they too were murdered' (Omer Bartov, 'Communal Genocide: Personal Accounts of the Destruction of Buczacz, Eastern Galicia, 1941-1944,' in *Shatterzone of Empires: Coexistence and Violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman Borderlands*, ed. Omer Bartov and Eric D. Weitz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 416). The obvious problem with this passage is that it contrasts Poles and Jewish community leaders and educated youths – in other words, regular folk – with Ukrainian nationalists, thereby implying that only the latter were primarily responsible for violence. The less obvious problem is logical. In both the Polish and Jewish cases, Bartov hews to the correct chronology: Poles benefited from discrimination in the interwar period and were then persecuted; Jews collaborated with the Nazi authorities and were then persecuted. In contrast, the structure of Bartov's sentence and his use of 'in turn' suggest that Ukrainians first committed violence and were then persecuted. In point of fact, the anti-Ukrainian persecution Bartov refers to occurred *before* Ukrainian violence and arguably was its cause. Christoph Mick engages in a similar kind of methodological error. In analyzing Polish, Jewish, and Ukrainian memories of L'viv under Soviet and German occupation, he draws on the notes, diaries, and eyewitness accounts of Jewish survivors, the 'diaries and documents from the Lviv Command of the Home Army (Armia Krajowa) and its predecessor organization, the Union for Armed Struggle (Związek Walk Zbrojnej),' which 'summarize the views of the local Polish population' and 'a few diaries and reports by the local group of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists,' supplemented by 'material taken from memoirs or from accounts which were written after the war.' Mick's choice of sources focuses on first-hand accounts of Jewish experiences, second-hand accounts of Polish experiences, and the first-hand accounts of Ukrainian nationalist experiences and a few second-hand accounts of remembered experiences. Needless to say, there are no grounds for comparison here (see Mick, 'Incompatible Experiences,' 339-40).

An equally egregious mistake is to suggest that the mutilations of the corpses were performed post-mortem by Ukrainian nationalists. The claim was given some prominence by Musial's book, *'Konterrevolutionäre Elemente sind zu erschießen,'*[102] and it has since then been repeated, casually and carelessly, as if it were an established fact, by scholars committed to one of the above two explanatory approaches who therefore suspend their otherwise active critical faculties.[103] Musial insists that, in their haste to escape the oncoming Germans, the Soviets did not have the time to torture their prisoners. Just how Musial knows that to be empirically true is unclear. After all, how much time does it take to cut off a tongue, breast, or penis? How much time does it take to nail a body to a wall or immerse it in boiling water? And if the Soviets had so little time, why methodically shoot each prisoner in the back of the head? Why not machinegun them? Or why not blow them to bits with hand grenades – as the Soviets did in Dubno, where they actually were under time pressure?[104] Why, as in Zalishchyki, place prisoners in freight cars, move them out onto a bridge, and then blow it up, thereby sinking the cars? One Polish eyewitness, Ludomił Szubartowicz, explicitly describes NKVD killing methods: first the victims were ordered to remove their clothes, then they were subjected to assembly-line shooting.[105] Another Polish eyewitness describes coming upon a prisoner in Ternopil'

102 Musial, *'Konterrevolutionäre Elemente sind zu erschießen,'* 266-67.

103 Alexander Prusin cites three sources for his claim that Ukrainian nationalists mutilated the bodies of their own compatriots for propaganda effect. One is Alfred Jasiński, who claims the exact opposite – that the NKVD was responsible. ('Nie było najmniejszej wątpliwości, kto był sprawcą tego zboczonego ludobójstwa' (Jasiński, 'Borysławska apokalipsa,' *Karta* 4 (April 1991): 112)). Another is Musial, but the page numbers Prusin cites are the wrong ones. A third is vaguely identified as belonging to a Polish émigré archive in London. John-Paul Himka cites two sources: Heer and Musial (Himka, 'Ethnicity and the Reporting of Mass Murder: *Krakivs'ki visti*, the NKVD Murders of 1941, and the Vinnytsia Exhumation,' in *Shatterzone of Empires: Coexistence and Violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman Borderlands*, ed. Omer Bartov and Eric D. Weitz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 393n23). Heer cites Musial, but at least Himka cites the correct pages in Musial. For Heer, see Hannes Heer, 'Lemberg 1941: Die Instrumentalisierung der NKVD-Verbrechen für Judenmord,' in *Kriegsverbrechen im 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. Wolfram Wette and Gerd R. Ueberschär (Darmstadt: Primus Verlag, 2001), 168-70.

104 Zhyv'iuk, *Za Moskovs'kym chasom*, 43.

105 Ludomił Szubartowicz, 'Wspomnienia z Buska (Październik 1992),' in *Dzieci Kresów*, ed. Lucyna Kulińska, vol. 4 (Kraków: Towarzystwo Milosników Lwowa i Kresów Poludniowo Wschodnich, 2013), 69-70.

who was buried, head down, up to his navel.[106] Such methods obviously took time.

Moreover, the German advance took time. The attack on the USSR was launched on 22 June and German troops entered L'viv, which is about 100 kilometers from the border, on 29-30 June. That meant that the Soviets had several days to evacuate L'viv and points east thereof. Unsurprisingly, the NKVD fled some towns, returned, finished the killing, and then fled a second time. But distance from the border did not necessarily deter the NKVD from devising fiendish methods of killing. As Piotr Chmielowiec shows, although the town of Dobromyl' was only 27 kilometers from the front in Przemyśl, the local NKVD initially killed prisoners by smashing their heads with hammers and then dumping their bodies in a salt mine. Only later, on 26 June, did the NKVD feel the pressure of the approaching Wehrmacht and adopt a faster means of killing: shooting in the back of the head.[107] Small wonder that Gross concludes: 'Clearly, there was bureaucratic supervision of the killings or, at least, of the order in which they were carried out … Indeed, several episodes from the Lwów massacre indicate that the NKVD went about this madness in an orderly fashion … Evidence of torture is especially abundant from smaller towns, whose relatively small and manageable prison populations could be killed leisurely."[108]

Musial overlooks another obvious objection. If the Soviets really did lack time, then why did the alleged nationalist perpetrators not lack time? Unlike the Soviets, they were not in charge of the prisons and had first to open them and discover the bodies. Indeed, they would have had to be devilishly clever to time their mutilations just after the Soviets departed and just before the locals discovered the corpses.

To ascribe such atrocities to the nationalists is also to evince ignorance of their *esprit*. Although they were fully capable of committing great violence against their perceived enemies, including Ukrainians accused of being turncoats and collaborators, the nationalists held the Ukrainian nation and its 'best' representatives – and the political prisoners killed by the NKVD, very many of whom were OUN members, automatically qualified for this role – as well-nigh sacred. Post-mortem mutilations of the Ukrainian nation would have been unacceptable to the nationalists.

106 Czesław Blicharski, 'Masakra więźniów w Tarnopolu,' in his edited volume *Tarnopolanie na starym ojców szlaku* (Gliwice: W. Wiliński, 1994), 203.

107 Piotr Chmielowiec, 'Zbrodnie sowieckie na więźniach w czerwcu 1941 r. – Dobromil, Lacko,' in *Kresy Południowo-wschodnie Rzeczypospolitej pod okupacją sowiecką 1939-1941*, ed. Piotr Chmielowiec and Irena Kozimala (Rzeszów: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2014), 74-77.

108 Gross, *Revolution from Abroad*, 180-81.

Musial's sources are also suspect, amounting to a few accounts made by Polish and Jewish survivors of the Massacre. None actually witnessed the alleged mutilations; some even say they concluded the mutilations had to be the handiwork of the nationalists because they, the mutilations, were identical to those found on Polish bodies in Volhynia in 1943.[109] But that claim discredits itself by its retroactive nature; moreover, it proves our point that, while nationalists could have committed extreme violence against Poles, they would not have done so against 'true' Ukrainians.

It is, finally, significant that there is almost complete unanimity among Ukrainian, Polish, and Jewish eyewitness accounts about Soviet responsibility for the mutilations. The weight of the available evidence so obviously undermines Musial's claims as to make them appear irresponsible. It is important to note in this regard that the secret reports of the German Einsatzkommando also speak of discoveries of bodily mutilations. One might be inclined to view such reports as self-serving or mendacious, except that they were highly secret and thus in all likelihood accurate. Besides, there was no need for the Einsatzkommandos to lie so early in the war, when German victory seemed imminent.

Our final methodological concern involves ascribing the violence to 'Ukrainians' or 'the' Ukrainians (or 'Poles' or 'the' Poles). Such a move is an unacceptable form of ethnic stereotyping that we resolutely reject. No less important, it obscures a critically important question that should be asked, but cannot be answered: Just how many Ukrainians and Poles were implicated in the ethnic violence against Jews? Some Jewish accounts of the violence imply that the entire non-Jewish population was directly involved. Surely, that is an exaggeration, as all 5 million Ukrainians, or all 1.5 million Poles, could not possibly have engaged in pogroms. We have no idea how many Ukrainians and Poles took an active part in the violence, but we strongly suspect that they – as in all cases of ethnic violence – represented a tiny minority of both populations. Unsurprisingly, there is empirical evidence to suggest that Jews were less represented in the NKVD and other Soviet organs in Western Ukraine than Ukrainian and Polish victimization narratives suggest.[110] By extension, Jewish victimization narratives probably overstate the extent of animosity by Poles and Ukrainians.[111]

109 Musial, *'Konterrevolutionäre Elemente sind zu erschießen,'* 268.

110 See Kyrychuk, 'Radians'kyi teror 1939-1941 rr.,' 59; Himka, 'Ethnicity and the Reporting of Mass Murder,' 389.

111 Olia Hnatiuk emphasizes that relations between Ukrainians, Poles, and Jews in L'viv were far more complex than national narratives suggest (see Hnatiuk, 'Vidvaha i strakh,' *Zbruč* (8 September 2015), http://zbruc.eu/node/41165).

Similar kinds of unstated biases are evident in the writings of both scholars and memoirists, whether indigenous to Western Ukraine or not. Perpetrators of violence against Jews in mid-1941 are frequently said to have participated in 'the Holocaust.' In fact, they could not have, as the Final Solution had not yet been decided upon and the term, Holocaust, did not yet exist. A more accurate statement would be that their actions may be interpreted by historians as contributing to the Holocaust, even though they themselves did not consciously do so. Another bias concerns naming. All too often, if a Ukrainian or Polish peasant engages in violence against a Jewish communist, the actors concerned are defined as a Ukrainian or Pole on the one hand and a Jew on the other – a choice that fits easily with an explanatory narrative centered on anti-Semitism or the nationalists. By the same token, if a Jewish communist engages in violence against a Ukrainian or Polish peasant, the actors are usually viewed as a communist on the one hand and a peasant on the other – an odd, though revealing, reversal of the relationship.

Clearly, outrage at the Massacre affected different individuals and population groups differently. Some people responded with violence; others with passivity or indifference; still others with shock, fear, and anger. Omer Bartov captures the difficulty of navigating such extreme situations well:

> But testimonies also tell us that just as perpetrators occasionally showed pity of compassion, rescuers were hardly always altruistic, as motivations for action ranged from pure goodness to cynical exploitation. While a few men with blood on their hands occasionally chose to save someone, others masqueraded as rescuers only to rob and betray those they sheltered; while many upstanding citizens became complicit in plunder and murder, some wretchedly poor peasants shared their last crumbs with the desperate remnants of destroyed communities. Some sought a postwar alibi, others paid back moral debts: generalizing about motivation is futile.[112]

We add that generalizing about motivation is not just futile, but also methodologically incorrect, because motivations varied from individual to individual and because we have no empirical evidence – no memoirs, no eyewitness accounts, no diaries – by perpetrators. As a result, the most we can do is to infer motives from behavior, a high-risk strategy prone to stereotyping and error. We therefore believe that generalizing about

112 Bartov, 'Communal Genocide,' 416.

motivation is also methodologically and morally wrong – as wrong as generalizing about guilt, responsibility, complicity, and criminality.

The Structure of the Sourcebook

The sourcebook is intended for both scholars and general readers with knowledge of English, German, and several Slavic languages. We decided against translating the materials into English, so as to enable readers – who, we suspect, will primarily be readers of Ukrainian, Polish, and/or Russian – to have access to the language of the originals and to make up their own minds about the interplay of texts, memory, and history. The sourcebook includes selections of already published scholarly and analytical materials on the Massacre; eyewitness accounts, survivors' testimonies, and memoirs by Ukrainians, Poles, Jews, and Germans; contemporary European, American, and Soviet newspaper reports; Soviet government directives and German and Polish reports; photographs; brief biographical information about the documents' authors, a glossary, and bibliography. In order to make the book more accessible to general readers, the scholarly selections are being reprinted without footnotes.

In addition, the documentary material includes two personal profiles of our relatives, Father Ivan Kiebuz and Bohdan Hevko. Ivan Kiebuz was arrested by NKVD agents on 23 June, tortured, and then executed on the 26th in the prison in Dobromyl', his mutilated body dumped in a shallow pit in the town's prison yard. His parishioners recognized him and took his body for burial in the cemetery of the village of Makowa, where he had served as their cleric. Members of the OUN witnessed the burial on 29 June, on their way from Bircza to Dobromyl'.[113] Bohdan Hevko was arrested on 22 June, tortured, and then executed on the 30th in the prison in Peremyshliany, his mutilated body dumped in a deep pit in the town's prison yard. His relatives recognized him and took his body for burial in Peremyshliany's cemetery.[114]

In the quest for numbers, we often forget that it is the unique lives tragically lost that are at the core of the abstract category called 'Massacre.' The

113 Information based on the testimony of one of his surviving brothers who sent a letter describing the circumstances of his death to the Ukrainian Catholic University in Rome. See 'Sviashchenyky ispovidnyky i muchenyky (Sacerdotes confessors et martyres),' *Bohosloviia* 48 (1984): 229-30, and Bohdan Prakh, *Dukhovenstvo Peremys'koï Eparkhiï ta Apostol's'koï administratsiï Lemkivshchyny*, vol.1, *Biohrafichni narysy, 1939-1989* (L'viv: Ukraïns'kyi katolyts'kyi universytet, 2015), 8-9.

114 Mariia Vishchuk, 'Spohady,' *Zona* 13 (1998): 163-64.

accounts of the killings speak for themselves, yet the victims are silent, many even nameless. They did not die in battle, but were civil servants, retired officers, doctors, lawyers, judges, clergy, professors, journalists, politicians, engineers, masons, students, and peasants. They were men and women, young and old – ranging from teenagers to octogenarians – whose histories have vanished. They were Ukrainians, Poles, and Jews.

It is to their memory – and especially to Ivan Kiebuz and Bohdan Hevko – that we dedicate this volume on this, the 75th anniversary of the Great West Ukrainian Prison Massacre.